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I. INTRODUCTION
Susan C. sued Sam E. for divorce in the local district court and
sought custody of the couple's only child.' Each parent accused the
other of sexually abusing the child.2 The local district court appointed
a guardian ad litem and engaged expert assistance to determine the truth
of the allegations. 3 During this investigative period, the court granted
the divorce, but maintained continuing jurisdiction over the child
custody matter, pending conclusive findings as to the alleged abuse.4
Susan C. then fled the jurisdiction, hiding both her whereabouts and
that of her child.5 Fearing the likelihood of further abuse, the district
court issued a writ of habeas corpus ordering her to return the child to
the jurisdiction. 6 The guardian ad litem retained a private investigator
and eventually located Susan C. and the child in Washington State. 7 The
district court then sought to enforce the writ and requested Washington's
help in securing the child's safe return to the jurisdiction8 so the
1. See Petition for Dissolution of Marriage, Susan C. v. Sam E. (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. Oct. 23,
1991) (No. 91-DV-07).
2. Interview with Hon. Elizabeth Callard & Hon. Michael Stancampiano, District Court Judges,
Southern Ute Tribal Court, Ignacio, Colo. (Jan. 13, 1999) [hereinafter Callard/Stancampiano
Interview].
3. Id.
4. See Decree of Dissolution of Marriage, Susan C. v. Sam E. (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. Oct. 20,
1992) (No. 91-DV-07). The decree placed the child in the mother's custody, with alternative holiday
and extended summer visitation to the father, but also required continuing individual therapy for the
father and mother, with Tribal Social Services required to provide updates to the tribal court for an
unspecified time period. See id. at 2. The decree further ordered "that the Tribal Court shall retain
jurisdiction over this matter as provided in the Southern Ute Indian Tribal Code and such other
recognized law as may apply." Id. at 3.
In June, 1994, the father moved to modify the custody arrangement, seeking exclusive custody.
The mother countered by seeking to prohibit any visitation by the father.
Some time between October 20, 1994, and December 1, 1994, while the issue of custody
was still pending, Ms. C.[ I fled the jurisdiction of the Court taking the child with her and
refusing both to produce the child for evaluation and play therapy as required and to
appear at hearings scheduled in regard to the pending custody matter.
See Order of Judge Elizabeth C. Callard, Susan C. v. Sam E., 3 (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. July 7,
1997) (No. 91-DV-07).
Although Washington courts would later interpret the tribal court's findings on the issue of
abuse allegations as inconclusive and bare, the tribal court record contained reports from both parents
that the child had been subjected to sexual abuse and a professional psychologist reported to the tribal
court that in her opinion, the child had been the victim of molestation, but that the alleged abuser had
not yet been identified. Thereafter, the presiding Judge ordered the mandatory play therapy and
scheduled additional investigative hearings on the matter. See Order of Judge Elizabeth C. Callard,
Susan C. v. Sam E. (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. Aug. 25, 1995) (No. 91-DV-07).
5. Callard/Stancampiano Interview, supra note 2; see also Order and Writ of Habeas Corpus,
Susan C. v. Sam E. (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. Aug. 12, 1995) (No. 91-DV-07).
6. See Order and Writ of Habeas Corpus, Susan C. v. Sam E. (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. Aug. 25,
1995) (No. 91-DV-07).
7. Callard/Stancanpiano Interview, supra note 2.
8. See Order Directing Washington Law Enforcement Agencies to Take Custody of Benjamin
E., a Minor, and Deliver Said Minor to Representative of the Department of Social Services of the
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investigation could be completed and a final custody order entered. The
Washington State courts refused to recognize the prior judicial orders
reasoning that, because the child was not within the territorial jurisdiction
of the district court at the time the writ was issued, the district court
lacked jurisdiction over the child.9 Five years later, Susan C. remains in
Washington with her child. 10 No available remedy exists either for the
district court or the father to force the mother or the child to return for
court dates or scheduled visitations.
How, one might ask, could Susan C. circumvent the district court's
authority and succeed in an act of parental kidnapping otherwise prohib-
ited by federal law?II In retelling this case history, I have omitted only
one fact: the local district court was a tribal court.
This parental kidnapping provides a disturbing but hardly unique
illustration of how deference to and cooperation with tribal courts com-
pares with recognition afforded to other courts within our federal union.
Had the local district court been a state court, or even a court of a
foreign country,12 the outcome likely would have differed.
In this article I examine the political and legal relationships between
tribal courts and their state and federal counterparts. I appraise the state
courts' policies for determining whether tribal court judgments are to be
recognized and subsequently enforced, cross-jurisdictionally. I explore
the practical experiences of contemporary tribal court systems. Based
on evidence gathered from tribal court records, survey responses and
Southern Ute Indian Tribe, In re Benjamin E. (Wash. Super. Ct. Jan. 29, 1996) (No. 96-2-00).
9. See Benjamin W.E. v. Susan C., No. 16474-8-Ill, 1998 WL 289167 (Wash. Ct. App. May 26,
1998). The Court of Appeals for Washington concluded that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction to
issue the writ against the child because Susan C. was the "legal custodial parent." Id. at *4.
10. Callard/Stancampiano Interview, supra note 2.
11. See Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). Had
the issuing court in this scenario been a state court, Washington would have a duty under federal law
to enforce the custody and visitation determinations. See id. § 1738A(a). See generally Thompson v.
Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 175-78 (1988).
12. The strikingly similar case of leronimakis v. leronimakis, 831 P.2d 172 (Wash. Ct. App.
1992), is illustrative. In leronimakis, a U.S. citizen, moved her two children from Greece back to her
home state of Washington where she sought to divorce her Greek husband, alleging physical abuse to
herself and their children. See id. at 173, 184. Thereafter, the father commenced child custody
proceedings in Greece. See id. at 174. Based on the policy considerations of Uniform Child Custody
Jurisdiction Act (section 26.27 of the Revised Code of Washington), and forum non conveniens,
Washington declined jurisdiction in favor of Greece stating:
To allow Washington courts to assert jurisdiction because [she] generated significant
contacts with the state is in effect telling any abducting parent that if you can stay away
from home long enough.., that is a sufficient reason for the new state to assert a right to
adjudicate the issue.
... It would be an unacceptable precedent to reward the abducting parent without
any substantial showing that such action is necessary to avoid threatened mistreatment
and abuse of the children.
Id. at 177-78. The Court expressed concern that failure to defer to Greek jurisdiction would
effectively deny the children "any reasonable relationship with their father and would be cut off from
their Greek heritage." Id. at 178.
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interviews with tribal court officials throughout the country, I document
the law of tribal judgment recognition as it operates on the ground,
demonstrating that it often deviates markedly from law on the books.
Along the way I consider whether current federal full faith and credit
mandates and uniform laws provide an appropriate and effective model.
I conclude that non-recognition of tribal court judgments is a problem-
atic reality growing out of an increasingly restrictive view of tribal adjudi-
catory jurisdiction, a lack of uniformity of approaches, and a failure to
implement procedures to effectuate those laws that do exist.
In conclusion, I explore possible remedies to ensure more consistent
cross-jurisdictional recognition and enforcement. Based on my analysis
of the workings of state-tribal relationships as expressed through recogni-
tion and non-recognition of tribal court judgments, I specifically recom-
mend strengthening the existing federal full faith and credit mandates by
providing federal enforcement assistance.
II. "RECOGNITION" DEFINED
To investigate the tribal court experience, the term "recognition"
of judgments must be broadly defined. At the forefront is the standard
inquiry of what force and effect a reviewing court will afford judgments
rendered by a tribal court. 13 But, "recognition" in terms of the ap-
proach taken by non-judicial state agencies when tribal court orders are
at issue is also a necessary part of the inquiry. These non-judicial agen-
cies include law enforcement officials and administrative agencies, such
as vital statistics departments, health and human services agencies, and
child support enforcement agencies.
Much of the caselaw and the majority of commentaries on recogni-
tion and enforcement of judgments focuses on money judgments within
the judicial system. 14 The prevailing party seeks ratification of an earlier
13. The area of law governing the recognition and enforcement of judgments, that do not other-
wise fall within the federal full faith and credit scheme is generally governed by the United States
Supreme Court decision in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895):
[W]here there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of
competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings, after due citation
or voluntary appearance by the defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration of justice ... and there is nothing to show either
prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in
procuring the judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of his nation should
not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not ... be tried afresh ....
Id. at 202-03.
Addressing whether a lack of reciprocity should preclude recognition, Hilton concluded that
reciprocity is a prerequisite. See id. at 228. Although the reciprocity requirement is no longer
recognized in many jurisdictions, Hilton's other pronouncements continue to prevail. See, e.g., UNi.
FoRmGN MoNEY Juu aers REcoGNrnoN AcT, 13 U.L.A. 261 (1986).
14. See generally Robert Laurence, The Off-Reservation Garnishment of On-Reservation Debt
2000] 315
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final judgment on the merits by a court within another jurisdiction. The
goal is to obtain the second jurisdiction's assistance in enforcing the
decision of the first court.15 Limiting the discussion to these types of
court-to-court scenarios, however, ignores a range of other practical
problems encountered by individuals seeking recognition of tribal court
orders. For instance, if a tribal court enters a domestic violence protec-
tion order, do state law enforcement officials provide precautionary pro-
tection on the basis of that order alone? Will a state department of vital
statistics record information from a tribal court paternity decree without
a subsequent order of recognition issued by a state court? Will a state
child support enforcement agency assist in collecting payments ordered
by a tribal court without being ordered to do so by a state court? Will a
state-operated mental institution accept a tribal commitment order?
Even if we narrow the focus to court-to-court relations only, there
are broader "recognition" issues than whether the tribal court judgment
will receive full faith and credit or comity by the state court. Is relitiga-
tion of issues precluded by virtue of prior tribal court rulings in related
cases? Do states enter competing orders with the knowledge that a tribal
court is simultaneously exercising jurisdiction, even if a final judgment
has not been reached?
Each of these scenarios is encompassed within the meaning of
"recognition" for purposes of this study, with the ultimate comparison
being whether a state's action or inaction would differ had the issuing
court been something other than a tribal forum.
III. TRIBAL COURTS
Tribal courts today entertain an extensive range of cases from
misdemeanor criminal matters to complex corporate tort claims. 16 The
and Related Issues in the Cross-Boundary Enforcement of Money Judgments, 22 AM. I NDIAN L. REV.
355, 356 (1998); Christopher P. Hall & David B. Gordon, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in the
United States, 1O-AUT INT'L L. PRACTICUM 57, 58-59 (1997); Jeremy Maltby, Note, Juggling Comity
and Self-Government: The Enforcement of Foreign Libel Judgments in U.S. Courts, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1978, 1983-84 (1994); Ronald A. Brand, Enforcement of Foreign Money-Judgments in the United
States: In Search of Uniformity and International Acceptance, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 253, 262-65
(1991).
15. See generally Jerome A. Hoffman, Recognition by Courts in the Eleventh Circuit of
Judgments Rendered by Courts of Other Countries, 29 CUMB. L. REV. 65, 66-75 (1998) (discussing
recognition and enforcement).
16. Although tribal courts exercise jurisdiction over both Indians and non-Indians, the majority of
tribal court cases involve tribal members or residents of the reservation. See Ho-CHuNK NATION TRIAL
COURT REPORT ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY (1996-1997) (on file with author). A breakdown of cases in-
volving non-Indians during 1996 and 1997 in the Ho-Chunk Nation provides an example of the type of
cases involving non-Indian litigants brought in tribal court. See id. During this time period, 266 civil
cases were filed in the Ho-Chunk Nation. See id. Only 32 involved non-Indian parties. See id. The
majority of those cases, 26 involved employment disputes concerning non-Indian parties who are
employed by the tribe. See id. In two actions, the non-Indian won outright. See id. Ten favorably
settled and the non-Indian litigant voluntarily dismissed one case. See id. The trial court dismissed six
overall: three for want of prosecution and three for lack of substantive evidence. See id. Seven
316 [VOL. 76:311
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various tribal court systems 17 enforce diverse substantive laws and
procedural requirements, but tribal courts, like their state counterparts,
are uniformly subject to the federally mandated minimum due process
requirements. The states are mandated by the U.S. Constitution and the
tribes are mandated by the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).18 The
Honorable Robert Yazzie, Chief Justice of the Navajo Nation, provides a
tribal court interpretation of the ICRA:
What about the Indian Civil Rights Act? Doesn't it override
everything? Look at it another way: The Indian Civil Rights
Act has certain "minimums" you must follow. However, when
it comes to ideas of due process, which is basic fairness, or
equal treatment of persons, Indian values most often give far
more protections and consideration than Anglo values. Too
often, it seems that "due process" in non-Indian court systems
means power and money. To Indians, it means respect, talking
things out, listening to everyone's point of view, and using
your values. 19
As an additional check to tribal adjudicatory authority, all
challenges to tribal court jurisdiction are granted federal review. 20 These
"safeguards," 21 to tribal court authority are relatively new additions to
cases remained for litigation at the end of 1997. See id.
Of the new cases filed in the Ho-Chunk trial court during 1996, 42% involved child support
enforcement, 21% dealt with internal tribal governmental matters, 29% involved employment law, 7%
were contract disputes, and only 1% were tort cases. See id. Although the ratio of Indian to non-
Indian litigants varies from court to court, tribal courts do not generally have significant impact on
non-Indians unless they are domiciled within Indian country or if they have entered into a consensual
business or domestic relationship with the Indian tribe or its members. See Nell Jessup Newton, Tribal
Court Praxis: One Year in the Life of Twenty Indian Tribal Courts, AM. INDIAN L. REV. 285, 299 (1998)
(providing an overview of the types of cases published in the Indian Law Reporter in 1996).
17. The number of tribal courts has increased dramatically in the last two decades. There were
only 117 tribal courts identified in 1976. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 n.21
(1978). Presently, the number of tribal court systems exceeds 170. See Hon. Sandra Day O'Connor,
Lessons From the Third Sovereign: Indian Tribal Courts, 9 TRIBAL CT. REC. 12 (1996).
18. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (1994). Section 1302 of the ICRA ensures many rights guaranteed in
the United States Constitution, but reveals certain differences. In comparison to the First Amendment,
which prohibits any "laws respecting establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof," the ICRA's only limitation is against laws "prohibiting free exercise of religion."
Id. § 1302(1). In comparison to the Sixth Amendment, the ICRA's provisions differ only in respect
that the accused is entitled to an attorney at his own expense. See id. § 1302(6). The ICRA limits
tribal courts from imposing a sentence for more than one year and a $5,000 fine. See id. § 1302(7).
With these few exceptions, there are many similarities between the Bill of Rights and the ICRA.
Section 1302 incorporates the language of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, for example, as well as
the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection language.
19. See Robert Yazzie, Speech, Developing Tribal Common Law (Annual Conference of the
National American Indian Courts Judges Association Mar. 22, 1999) (transcript on file with author).
20. See National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985)
(stating that tribal jurisdiction is a federal question to be determined by federal district courts); see also
Melissa L. Koehn, Civil Jurisdiction: The Boundaries Between Federal and Tribal Courts, 29 Aiuz. ST.
L.J. 705, 714-23 (1997).
21. One's take on the passage of the ICRA and the federal court's willingness to treat any
challenge to tribal court jurisdiction as a federal question is a matter of perspective. To those seeking
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federal Indian law, and represent the ongoing attempt to define the
relationship of tribal governments within, or to, our federal union.22
A. HISTORY OF CHANGING RELATIONSHIPS
Tribal court judgments were first discussed within the context of the
American legal system in 1855 when the United States Supreme Court
decided United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe.23 In Mackey, the Court
recognized a Cherokee Nation order on the basis that tribes were
"territories" under a federal probate statute. 24 Although the opinion
does not state whether an Indian tribe is a territory under the
implementing statute of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 25 Mackey
remains the only case in which the Supreme Court has addressed what
force and effect is due a final tribal court judgment. 26 To give Mackey
its proper context, some discussion of the origins of federal Indian law is
warranted.
When the United States Supreme Court decided the first Indian law
cases, the central question was where tribal governments would fit into
the federal union, if at all. This question required the Court to define
tribal governments either as foreign nations or as entities occupying a
contextual position within our federal union.
The Supreme Court's initial attempt to define the relationship
suggested a tribal existence within the federal union, yet simultaneously
recognized elements of enduring tribal sovereignty. 27 Chief Justice John
to limit tribal authority, these measures are "safeguards." On the other hand, these measures signifi-
cantly infringe on tribal self-government by injecting the procedures and values of non-Indian legal
thought into political systems that never consented to such. "In Lockean social compact terms, Indian
tribes never entered into or consented to any constitutional social contract by which they agreed to be
governed by federal or state authority, rather than by tribal sovereignty." Robert N. Clinton, Tribal
Courts and the Federal Union, 26 WILLAMETIE L. REV. 841, 847 (1990).
22. See id. at 843-66; Judith Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the
Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 671, 690-701 (1989). See generally Richard A. Monette, A New
Federalism for Indian Tribes: The Relationship Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our
Federalism and Republican Democracy, 25 U. TOL. L. REv. 617 (1994).
23. 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 102 (1855).
24. See United States ex rel. Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 104 (1855).
[IIt shall be unlawful for any person or persons to whom letters testamentary or of
administration hath been or may be hereafter granted, by the proper authority in any of
the United States or territories thereof, to maintain any suit or action, and to prosecute
and recover any claim in the district of Columbia, in the same manner as if the letters of
testamentary or administration had been granted... in the said District.
12 Cong. ch. 106, 2 Stat. 755 (1848).
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
26. Over a century later, the .United States Supreme Court buries its only other relevant pro-
nouncement in a footnote to Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez: "Judgments of tribal courts, as to matters
properly within their jurisdiction, have been regarded in some circumstances as entitled to full faith
and credit in other courts." 436 U.S. 49, 65-66 n.21 (1978) (citing Mackey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100).
27. This speaks only to the federal government's view of tribes within the federal union, and
does not suggest that tribes should, or do, adopt the same interpretation. To the contrary, many tribal
courts reject this interpretation. See Order of Judge M.J. Stancampiano, Durango Credit and Collec-
tion v. Weaver (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. Oct. 17, 1997) (No. 97-CV-13) (stating that the Southern Ute
[VOL. 76:311318
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Marshall, in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,28 attempted to clarify the
relationship by defining Indian tribes as "domestic dependent
nations." 29 The phrase placed tribes outside the scope of Article 111,30
thus denying tribes access to federal courts, yet contextually included
tribes within the federal union by dispelling the notion that they were
foreign nations. 31 Justice Marshall's definition adapted well to the feder-
al Indian policy emerging in the 1830s, and which would prevail toward
the end of the nineteenth century, because it justified contemporaneous
efforts to subject tribal governments to federal control.32
After forced relocation to Indian Territory, the government of the
Cherokee Nation was reestablished in 1839,33 including the constitu-
tionally created tribal court from which Mackey originated. Following
Mackey, the Eighth Circuit decided several similar cases, each involving
Tribe of Indians has elected to extend general principles of comity to judgments of other jurisdictions
because "the 'full faith and credit clause' of the federal Constitution is not applicable to Indian
tribes"). The Navajo Nation also uses comity to recognize state and federal decisions. See generally
James W. Zion, Many Passports, Many Frontiers: The Movement of Indian Judgments and Laws In
and Out of Indian Country, in FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: A PASSPORT TO SAFETY 167-79 (Byron R.
Johnson & Neil S. Websdale eds., 1997).
Scholarly debate over the tribes' obligation to extend full faith and credit to state and federal
court judgments has evolved into two schools of thought. One side, most notably Professors Ragsdale
and Clinton, adopts a symmetrical approach, positing that if tribes are to be "territories" under 28
U.S.C. § 1738, then the tribes would also be constitutionally compelled to recognize state and federal
judgments by extending them full faith and credit. See Clinton, supra note 21, at 909; Fred L. Rags-
dale, Problems in the Application of Full Faith and Credit for Indian Tribes, 7 N.M. L. Rev. 133 (1977).
Conversely, Professor Laurence, with whom I agree on this matter, contends that an asymmetrical
model is more appropriate in the Indian law context. See Laurence, supra note 14, at 360.
28. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
29. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
30. At issue in Cherokee Nation was whether the tribe was entitled to access federal courts to
resolve an issue between the State of Georgia and the Cherokee Nation. See id. at 29. Article III
limits judicial power to controversies between the states of the union, between states and private
citizens, and between foreign nations and private citizens. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
31. It is interesting to note, for purposes of the tribal court recognition approaches discussed infra
Part IV, that Cherokee Nation's dissenting Justices Thompson and Story chose to address the Indian
question as a matter of foreign relations, concluding that Indian tribes were foreign governments. See
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 51 (Thompson, J., dissenting). This view is consistent with the current trend by
federal courts to apply principles of international comity to tribal court review.
32. This federal policy had been categorized as "removal and relocation" and prevailed in the
period between 1828 and 1887. See VINE DELORIA, JR. & CLIFFORD M. LYTLE, AMERICAN INDIANS,
AMERICAN JUSTICE 6-8 (1983); see also Act of 1830, Removal of the Indians West of the Mississippi, 4
STAT. 411-13 (1850); President Jackson on Indian Removal (Dec. 8, 1829), reprinted in DocumENTs OF
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY 47-48 (Francis Paul Prucha, ed., University of Neb. Press 2d ed. 1990)
(suggesting that lands be set aside west of the Mississippi for exclusive control by each particular
tribe); Message of President Monroe on Indian Removal (Jan. 27, 1825), reprinted in DocuMmJrs F
UNITED STATES INDIAN POLICY, supra at 39-40 (proposing a voluntary removal policy as the best
solution against encroaching white settlers and increased pressures from state governments).
Professor Strickland notes, however, that the federal removal and relocation policy was
opposed by many non-Indians: "more than one million people, in a nation with a population of about
twelve million, wrote Congress and signed petitions protesting the removal bill." RENNAtD STRICKLAND,
ToNTo's REvENGE: REFLECTIONS ON AMERICAN INDIAN CULTURE AND POuCY 107 (1997).
33. See CHEorKJE NATION CONST. OF 1839 art. V (full text available at <http:\\www.geocities.com/
Heartland/Prairie/5918/lssues/1839constitution.htm>). See generally RENARDSuIcKOAND, FnE AND
ThE SPiRITs: CHEROKEE LAW FROM CLAN To COURT (1975).
2000] 319
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collateral attacks to tribal court judgments. 34 These included Mehlin v.
Ice,35 Exendine v. Pore,36 Standley v. Roberts,37 and Cornells v. Shan-
non. 38 In Mehlin and Exendine, which were argued in the same term
and decided in 1893, the Eighth Circuit concluded that judgments of the
Cherokee Nation "are on the same footing with the proceedings and
judgments of the courts of the territories of the Union, and are entitled to
the same faith and credit." 39  In Cornells, a Muscogee (Creek) Nation
judgment was also construed equivalent to judgments of the territorial
courts, to be afforded the same respect and the same faith and credit.40
Likewise, the Standley decision recognized the validity of a Choctaw
quiet title action. Curiously, none of these early cases pursues the analo-
gy of tribes to territories so as to reach the precise question of whether
full faith and credit was due tribal court judgments under the general full
faith and credit statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1738. These opinions nonetheless
indicate that by the turn of the last century, federal courts treated tribal
court judgments with the same respect as those of any other court within
the federal union. As a logical extension of these decisions, the federal
courts also demonstrated restraint by limiting post-exhaustion review
exclusively to issues of jurisdiction:4 1
34. The tone of these cases suggests that other tribal courts might have been treated differently
on review, because the tribes in Indian Territory during this era were considered more "civilized" in
their political organization. See, e.g., Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 12, 16 (8th Cir. 1893). Of the Cherokee
Nation, it was written:
By intermarriage with the whites, they have to a considerable extent come to be of mixed
blood. [sic] Generations ago they abandoned the chase and the war path, and adopted
the pursuits of civilized man. As far back as 1827 they adopted a written constitution,
modeled after the constitutions of the state then surrounding their country.
Id. at 17. More expressly, in terms of the Cherokee Nation's recognized jurisdiction over non-Indians,
the same court stated:
It is quite obvious that the jurisdiction conferred on the Cherokees could only have been
granted on the assumption that they were then a civilized people, having an established
government of their own, and that their laws and modes of trial were of a character
which made it proper to subject to their jurisdiction citizens of the Unites States settling
upon their lands. It is very clear no such jurisdiction would have been granted to a
savage or uncivilized tribe of Indians.
Id.
35. 56F. 12 (8th Cir. 1893).
36. 56 F. 777 (8th Cir. 1893).
37. 59 F. 836 (8th Cir. 1894).
38. 63 F. 305 (8th Cir. 1894).
39. Mehlin, 56 F. at 19; accord Exendine v. Pore 56 F. 777, 778 (8th Cir. 1893).
40. See Comells v. Shannon, 63 F. 305, 306-07 (8th Cir. 1894).
41. Federal district courts today do not exercise the same restraint. See Judith V. Royster, Stature
and Scrutiny: Post-Exhaustion Review of Tribal Court Decisions, 46 U. KAN. L. REV. 241, 245-46
(1998) (arguing that federal courts' de novo review of all tribal court determinations of federal law
relegate tribal courts to the role of preliminary fact finder); see also Phillip W.M. Lear & Blake D.
Miller, Exhaustion of Tribal Court Remedies: Rejecting Bright-Line Rules and Affirmative Action, 71
N.D. L. REV. 277 (1995).
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This court is not invested with appellate jurisdiction over the
proceedings of [those tribal] courts. However irregular and
erroneous their proceedings may be, their judgments, like those
of any other court, are not void, and are not subject to col-
lateral attack when it appears they had jurisdiction of the
subject-matter and the person.4 2
This language is just as strong as contemporaneous federal court
decisions concerning state-to-state recognition:
A judgment is conclusive ... and it needs no authority to show
that it cannot be impeached either in or out of the State by
showing that it was based on a mistake of law. Of course, a
want of jurisdiction over either the person or the subject-matter
might be shown... But as the jurisdiction of the [state] court is
not open to dispute the judgment cannot be impeached .. .
even if it went upon a misapprehension of the [state] law.4 3
Cornells, Mehlin, Exendine and Mackey each involved non-Indian parties
over whom the tribal court had exercised jurisdiction. The reviewing
federal courts unequivocally validated this jurisdictional claim. Specifi-
cally, in Mehlin, the defendant attempted to nullify the tribal court pro-
ceedings on the basis that he was a "white man, and a citizen of the
United States." 44 The federal courts rejected this challenge on the basis
that the defendant had waived personal jurisdiction. 45 The Court rea-
soned that personal jurisdiction was a privilege that the defendant might,
and did, waive.46
42. Cornells, 63 F. at 307 (determining jurisdiction in a dispute where the Muscogee (Creek)
Nation Court imposed a $30,000 fine on non-Indian for a cattle smuggling infraction). It is important
to note that there was no record from the tribal court on the question of jurisdiction, yet the federal
court exercised restraint and avoided relitigation of issues disposed of at the tribal level. See id. at
307.
43. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).
44. 56 F. at 19.
45. Likewise in Exendine, the defendant in a Cherokee Nation forcible entry and detainer action
was a citizen of the United States who, after losing at the tribal court level, sought to have the federal
district court relitigate the merits of the case. See 56 F. at 777-78. The Eighth Circuit, relying on
Mehlin, dismissed the federal action. See id. at 778 (citing Mehlin, 56 F. 12).
46. See Mehlin v. Ice, 56 F. 12, 19 (8th Cir. 1893). The Court allowed a waiver of personal
jurisdiction indicating that if the 1 th Amendment to the Constitution can be waived by a state, an
individual can waive personal jurisdiction:
A party may waive any provision either of a constitution, treaty, or statute intended for
his benefit. It is therefore competent for a white man to waive the treaty or statutory
stipulations exempting him from the jurisdiction of the Cherokee courts; and when he
enters a general appearance to an action pending in those courts, and pleads to the
merits, and there is a trial upon such plea, he thereby waives the exemption, and submits
himself to the jurisdiction of the court, and will not afterwards be heard to contest the
validity of the proceedings and judgment of the Cherokee court on the ground that it had
no jurisdiction of his person.
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From Mackey in 1855 to Cornells in 1894, the federal courts clearly
placed tribal courts on the same plane as the territorial courts of the
United States, and thus accorded them the same full faith and credit as
the states. This reasoning applied to tribal court civil adjudication re-
gardless of whether the litigants were Indian or non-Indian. This clear
mandate of recognition soon faded away, however, due to a shift in
federal Indian policy. 47 In fact, only four years after Cornells, Congress
abolished the Cherokee court system.48
When these Indian Territory cases were decided, the movement that
led to the late-nineteenth century demise of tribal courts was already
underway.4 9 A decade before Mehlin, a decision of the Brule Sioux
played the leading role as catalyst for a reactionary shift in federal
Indian policy following a murder trial memorialized as Ex Parte Crow
Dog.5 0
Crow Dog involved an intra-tribal murder on the Brule Sioux reser-
vation that had been resolved by a tribal mechanism that progressive
thinkers today might call "restorative justice."51 The murder was set-
tled, as a matter of tribal law, by a forum consisting of the family
members of both assailant and victim.52 Crow Dog's sentence called for
restitution to the victim's family 53 but the tribunal did not impose the
death penalty. One year later, Crow Dog was tried and sentenced to
death by the federal district court for the Dakota territory. 54 On appeal
l at 19-20. Compare this outcome to the Washington decision in Susan C. where the court ruled
that the tribe lacked personal jurisdiction even though Susan C. initiated the tribal proceedings. See
Benjamin W.E. v. Susan C., No. 16474-8-Ii, 1998 WL 289167 (Wash. Ct. App. May 26, 1998). In
Mehlin, a challenge to personal jurisdiction was discarded by the federal court by defendant's general
entry of appearance at the tribal level. 56 F. at 19. Within the state-state recognition context, personal
jurisdiction may be waived. Even a judgment rendered without personal jurisdiction may be entitled to
full faith and credit. See Baldwin v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Ass'n, 283 U.S. 522, 525-26 (1931).
47. See DELORIA & LYTLE, supra note 32, at 8-12 (defining the "allotment and assimilation"
period of federal Indian policy from 1887 to 1928).
48. See Act of June 28, 1898, 30 Stat. 495 (1899); STmcKLAND, supra note 32, at 175-82.
49. See SIDNEY L. H ARRiNO, CRow DoG's CASE: A mucAN INDIAN S OVEREIGNTY, TRIBAL LAw, AND
UNITED STATEs LAW IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 110-18 (1994). Sidney Harring documents that
Crow Dog's arrest, on the authority of an Indian agent that was "fully aware that the Brule had
already settled the case according to tribal law," was a calculated attempt on behalf of the Bureau of
Indian Affairs and the Department of Justice to use the circumstance as a test case to extend federal
jurisdiction into Indian country. Id. at 110-113.
50. See Exparte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556 (1883); B.J. Jones, Welcoming Tribal Courts Into the
Judicial Fraternity: Emerging Issues in Tribal-State and Tribal-Federal Courts Relations, 24 WM.
MrrcTH. L. REv. 457, 468-70 (1998).
51. "Restorative" justice is an innovative approach to criminal justice that advocates victim-
oriented programs such as restitution and community service programs. See generally, Charles W.
Colson, Truth, Justice, Peace: The Foundations of Restorative Justice, 10 REoENr U. L. REv. 1 (1998).
52. A tribal council meeting was held the day following the murder, in which an order ending the
trouble was issued. The council sent peacemakers to both families, and an agreement was reached to
restore harmony. See HARRmO, supra note 49, at 110.
53. See HAuiNoG, supra note 49, at 110. He was fined $600 in cash, eight horses, and one blanket.
See HARMRG, supra note 49, at 110.
54. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 557. Crow Dog was initially arrested by Indian police on the
orders of the reservation clerk and served one year in jail, pending the trial in Dakota territorial court.
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to the United States Supreme Court, Crow Dog was granted habeas relief
on the grounds that the United States lacked jurisdiction over an
intra-tribal murder occurring on the reservation. 55
This federal deference to tribal adjudicatory authority triggered
widespread public outcry. Conventional wisdom outside the Brule Sioux
Nation deemed Crow Dog's "punishment" inadequate and Congress
swiftly enacted the Indian Major Crimes Act 56 to provide for federal
jurisdiction over major crimes committed within Indian country, regard-
less of whether the parties involved were Indians or non-Indians. 57 The
law divested tribal courts of exclusive jurisdiction over certain crimes
committed within their own territories. 58
The same year Crow Dog was decided, the first Courts of Indian
Offenses were authorized. 59 The federal government established these
courts, commonly referred to as "CFR courts," 60 for the purpose of
civilizing the Indians by eliminating certain "undesirable" practices
among reservation Indians. 61 The Department of the Interior dictated
CFR court rules and procedures from the outset, and still does.62
The purpose of the CFR courts was to assimilate the Indians rather
than to provide a federally sanctioned court of tribal law. According to
an 1891 New York Times editorial, these courts originated "in the desire
to restrict and, as far as possible, abolish certain barbarous customs of the
See HARRING, supra note 49, at 110-11. At the time of Crow Dog's arrest, the BIA officials were
aware that the case had been resolved according to tribal law. See HARRINO, supra note 49, at 110.
55. See Crow Dog, 109 U.S. at 571-72.
56. 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994)).
57. See 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a). Initially consisting of seven enumerated crimes, the list of major
crimes has since been expanded to 14: murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, rape, statutory rape, assault
with intent to commit rape, incest, assault with intent to commit murder, assault with a dangerous
weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury, arson, burglary, robbery, and larceny. See id. See
generally United States v. John, 437 U.S. 634 (1978) (discussing jurisdiction in a case involving an
offense listed in the Indian Major Crimes Act); United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
58. This is not to suggest divestiture of concurrent jurisdiction as the statute does not expressly
diminish tribal jurisdiction. But see Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 203 n.14 (1978)
(suggesting exclusive federal jurisdiction).
59. See Yazzie, supra note 19. Courts of Indian Offenses were first authorized in 1883 as a
means to assimilate and control the Indians. See Yazzie, supra note 19.
It was a crime to see a medicine man. It was a crime to be a medicine man. Men (and it
was "men") who were selected to be judges had to cut their hair, wear a "citizen's
dress" (no blankets or feathers allowed) and have only one wife. The Indian judges of
the Court of Indian Offenses were appointed by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and
served at his pleasure. Those judges were under the supervision of an agency
superintendent, who could reverse a ruling at any time.
Yazzie, supra note 19.
60. The procedures are published in 25 C.F.R. pt. 11 (1999).
61. In his 1883 Annual Report, Secretary of the Interior Henry M. Teller mentioned his desire to
eliminate "heathenish practices" among the Indians through the establishment of these Courts. See
Annual Report of the Secretary of the Interior (Nov. 1, 1883), reprinted in DOCuMENTS oF UNITD
STATES INIAN PoLIcy, supra note 32, at 160-62.
62. Today, there are approximately 50 CFR courts. See Listing of Courts of Indian Offenses, 25
C.F.R. § 11.100 (1999). This number decreases each year, as tribes voluntarily develop their own
court systems and end the supervisory role of the CFR courts. See id. § 11.100(e).
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red men," and, it was hoped, "to have a good effect in accustoming
the red men to the settlement of their disputes and grievances by law in-
stead of by violence." 63 Soon CFR courts became the only recognized
tribunals in Indian country and the tribal courts became extinct.64
Within several decades, Congress and the executive branch
acknowledged that federal Indian policy of aggressive assimilation had
failed, 65 calling once again for a reversal of policy directives that led to
the passage of the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA).66 The
IRA encouraged reorganization of tribal governments. As a result,
many tribes adopted new constitutions and eventually revitalized their
tribal courts. Navajo Chief Justice Robert Yazzie clarifies a frequent
misconception about the IRA:
Our court systems were not created by the Indian Reorgani-
zation Act. They are recognized by the Indian Reorganization
Act. The law is quite clear that Indian courts are the creation
of their own Indian nation. 67
As tribal courts gradually asserted a renewed authority, the federal
courts faced the same questions Justice John Marshall had addressed in
the previous century, only somewhat more focused: where do tribal
courts fit into our federal system, if at all?
63. Indian Reservation Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 1981, reprinted in ROBERT G. HAYS, A RACE
AT BAY: NEW YORK TIMES EDrrORIALS ON "THE INDIAN PROBLEM," 1860-1900, at 341-42 (Southern IM1.
Univ. Press 1997).
64. This is not to suggest that traditional forums ceased to exist, but refers to the abolition of
courts that were openly visible to the outside world, such as in Mackey. See United States ex rel.
Mackey v. Coxe, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 100, 102-03 (1855) (comparing Cherokee Courts with state courts
and finding them equally responsible). The federal courts make little reference to tribal courts for a
period of nearly 50 years, from Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) to Head v. Hunter, 141 F.2d 449
(10th Cir. 1944) (addressing double jeopardy claim when federal prosecution follows dismissal from
Oglala tribal court). Search of Westlaw, Allfeds-Old Database (July 25, 2000) (search for documents
containing "Tribal Court" between the dates of May 18, 1896 and March 3, 1944) (yielding 21 cases
which refered to "Tribal Courts," 19 of which referred to the abolition of tribal courts and two of
which referred to "Tribal Courts" resolving inter-tribal disputes such as tribal membership). Tribal
courts were rarely mentioned in state court opinion during the same time period. Search of Westlaw,
Allstates Database (July 25, 2000) (search for documents containing "Tribal Court" between the dates
of May 18, 1896 and March 3, 1944) (yielding no documents which matched search terms). But see
Jimeson v. Pierce, 79 N.Y.S. 3 (N.Y. 1902) (referring to "peacemaking courts" as having jurisdiction
over inter-tribal matters). The modem Navajo Nation courts were established in 1959. See Navajo
Nation Council Res. CO-69-58, CJA-5-59 (codified as amended at NAVAJOTRIBAL CODE tit 7, § 101
(1969)); Robert Yazzie, "Life Comes From It: " Navajo Justice Concepts, 24 N.M. L. REv. 175, 177
n.17 (1994).
65. A reform movement, led by John Collier, culminated in a report to Congress indicating that
the failure of the allotment system, which led to a loss of roughly two-thirds of all Indian land, had
virtually robbed the Indians of the ability to be self-supportive. See 1934 Annual Report of the
Commissioner of Indian Affairs (1934), at 78-83, reprinted in DOcuMEmts OF UNrnED STATES IN A'
PoLicY, supra note 32, at 225-28.
66. Wheeler-Howard Act (Indian Reorganization Act) of 1934, Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984.
67. Yazzie, supra note 19.
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In the modem era, only the Ninth Circuit has directly answered the
question. In Wilson v. Marchington,68 the appeals court analogized
tribal courts to courts of foreign countries.69 According to Wilson,
principles of international comity as dictated in Hilton,70 and not full
faith and credit, govern whether a federal district court should recognize
and enforce a tribal court judgment.71 Wilson observed that Hilton's
rule of comity might not be completely right for the Indian situation. 72
But rather than softening the elements, the Ninth Circuit suggested using
the following parameters:
[Flederal courts must neither recognize nor enforce tribal
[court decisions] if: (1) the tribal court did not have both per-
sonal and subject matter jurisdiction; or (2) the defendant was
not afforded due process of law. In addition, a federal court
may, in its discretion, decline to recognize and enforce a tribal
judgment on equitable grounds, including the following cir-
cumstances: (1) the judgment was obtained by fraud; (2) the
68. 127 F.3d 805 (9th Cir. 1997).
69. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 811-12 (9th Cir. 1997).
70. Hilton is the leading case on recognition of foreign country judgments. See supra Part 1I.
71. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 807. Wilson. takes Hilton's application to tribes a step further, and
comments that the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law could also apply to tribes. The
Restatement suggests two mandatory and six discretionary grounds for non-recognition of foreign
judgments:
(1) A court in the United States may not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign
state if:
(a) the judgment was rendered under a judicial system that does not provide
impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law; or
(b) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction over the defendant
in accordance with the law of the rendering state and with the rules set forth in
§ 421.
(2) A court in the United States need not recognize a judgment of the court of a foreign
state if:
(a) the court that rendered the judgment did not have jurisdiction of the subject
matter of the action;
(b) the defendant did not receive notice of the proceedings in sufficient time to
enable him to defend;
(c) the judgment was obtained by fraud;
(d) the cause of action on which the judgment was based, or the judgment itself, is
repugnant to the public policy of the United States or of the State where
recognition is sought;
(e) the judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled to recognition;
or
(f) the proceeding in the foreign country was contrary to an agreement between
the parties to submit the controversy on which the judgment is based to another
forum.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONs LAW OF THE UNrIED STATES § 482 (1987); see also
Roger Alford & Christopher Gibson, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 32 INT'L LAW. 249, 250-51
(1998).
72. Although the status of Indian tribes as "dependent domestic nations" presents some unique
circumstances, comity still affords the best general analytical framework for recognizing tribal
judgments. See Wilson, 127 F.3d. at 810.
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judgment conflicts with another final judgment that is entitled
to recognition; (3) the judgment is inconsistent with the
parties' contractual choice of forum; or (4) recognition of the
judgment, or the cause of action Upon which it is based, is
against the public policy of the United States or the forum state
in which recognition of the judgment is sought. 73
Wilson imposes no reciprocal recognition duty on tribes,74 noting
that the requirement has "fallen into disfavor."75
[T]he Supreme Court "certainly did not mean to hold that an
American court was to recognize no obligations or duties
arising elsewhere until it appeared that the sovereign of the
locus reciprocally recognized similar obligations existing here.
That doctrine I am happy to say is not a part of American
jurisprudence." 76
The general rationale underlying rejection of the
reciprocity requirement is that it is a matter of diplomacy, best
negotiated by the executive and legislative branches. There
are, of course, substantive differences between foreign relations
with other nations and domestic relations with Native American
tribes
...The question of whether a reciprocity requirement
ought to be imposed on an Indian tribe before its judgments
may be recognized is essentially a public policy question best
left to the executive and legislative branches. 77
And what has become of Mackey and its Eighth Circuit progeny?
The Wilson court interprets Mackey's pronouncements on collateral
73. Id.
74. Except when otherwise required by local statute, the great majority of State and federal
courts have extended recognition to judgments of foreign nations without regard to any question of
reciprocity." REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONLIcr OF LAWS, § 98 cmt. f(1988). In fact, only six states
currently require reciprocity in their adaptation of the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Act, 13
U.L.A. 85 (Supp. 1999). See Russell J. Wientraub, Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments and
Child Support Obligations in United States and Canadian Courts, 34 TEx. INT'L L.J. 361, 363 n.25
(1999).
75. See Wilson, 127 F.3d at 811.
76. Id. at 812 (quoting Direction der Disconto-Geselishaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300 F.
741, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), afd 267 U.S. 22 (1925)).
77. Id.
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matters as "inconclusive" 78 in light of the fact that the Supreme Court
has never ruled on whether the general full faith and credit statute 79
includes Indian nations. Instead, the Ninth Circuit adopts the ruling in
Ex parte Morgan,80 an 1883 case out of the Western District of Arkansas,
in which the Cherokee Nation was not treated as "territory" under a
federal extradition statute.81
The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Morgan blurs various types of tribal
jurisdiction. Morgan, unlike Wilson and the Mackey line of cases, has
nothing to do with civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, but instead addresses
criminal jurisdiction. In Morgan, the Cherokee Nation was not con-
sidered a "territory" under a federal extradition statute. But no other
conclusion could have been reached given the fact that prior federal law
had divested Indian tribes of criminal jurisdiction over the fugitive that
the Cherokees were seeking:
It must appear to the governor honoring the requisition that the
tribunals of the demanding state or territory had jurisdiction to
try, or else how can a charge of crime be legally made ....
Now, ordinarily, properly charging a man with the crime of
murder, in a state or territory, would be sufficient to show
jurisdiction to try, because the courts all the states and territo-
ries have jurisdiction to try for the crime of murder, if com-
mitted within their boundaries, regardless of who commits the
crime and against whom it is committed. But this is not so in
the Cherokee Nation. The courts of that nation have juris-
diction, and can only try for the crime of murder when the
person murdered is an Indian, and the one charged with the
crime is also an Indian. 82
Given that the issue was how much deference a federal court should
extend to a tribal court order in a civil and not a criminal matter, the
attempt in Wilson to avoid the precedential force of Mackey is con-
fused.8 3 Wilson did not, of course, overrule Mackey. Instead, the case
78. See id. at 808.
79. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
80. 20 F. 298 (W.D. Ark. 1883). The court in Wilson notes that the U.S. Supreme Court cited Ex
parte Morgan with approval in New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468, 474-75 (1909). See
Wilson, 127 F.3d at 808.
81. See Exparte Morgan, 20F. 298, 307 (W.D. Ark. 1883). No credence was given to the fact
the United States Supreme Court has approvingly cited Mackey and Standley in subsequent cases.
"Judgments of tribal courts, as to matters properly within their jurisdiction, have been regarded in
some circumstances as entitled to full faith and credit in other courts." Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 66 n.21 (1978).
82. Morgan, 20 F. at 308.
83. In federal Indian law, it is crucial to properly distinguish what type of tribal jurisdictional
authority is at issue, because the results will differ greatly. For example, tribes have been divested of
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creates a split of authority in the federal system on the issue of whether
tribal courts are to be afforded the same faith and credit as state, federal
and territorial courts, or whether tribal courts should be granted only the
comity due to the courts of another nation. The decision also triggers
apprehension in some tribal judiciaries: "The recent federal rule under
the Ninth Circuit's decision in Wilson v. Marchington . . . will permit
widespread attacks against our court system's legitimacy," 84 commented
an official of the Navajo Court system.
If we are left to reconcile the two cases, the path from Mackey to
Wilson traces an ironic, indeed perverse, evolution of tribal court status.
At a point in history when Indian tribes negotiated treaties with the
United States85 and tribes were denied access to the federal courts to
adjudicate their claims, the federal courts granted full force and effect to
tribal court judgments as if they were states or territories.8 6 Now that
Indian treaty making is dead, 87 and Congress exercises "plenary"
authority 88 over tribes, the federal courts equate Indian tribes with
foreign nations.
Wilson does not note nor lend any significance to the procedural
safeguards already in place within our federal system.8 9 It improperly
equates tribes with foreign nations for judgment recognition purposes,
ignoring the fact that United States already exhibits controls on the tribal
courts process, with the ICRA and guaranteed federal question review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Likewise, Wilson fails to grasp that the
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, yet tribal civil adjudicatory and regulatory jurisdiction over
non-Indians is often permissible. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978)
(finding that Indian tribes lack criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians because it is "inconsistent with
their status" as domestic dependant nations); see also Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130,
159 (1982) (upholding tribal authority to tax non-Indian lessors); FMC v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,
905 F.2d 1311, 1312 (9th Cir. 1990) (upholding tribal authority over non-Indian business on fee lands
within the reservation); Resnik, supra note 22, at 729-34.
84. Letter from James W. Zion, Solicitor, The Navajo Nation, Judicial Branch to Stacy L. Leeds,
William H. Hastie Fellow, University of Wisconsin Law School (Oct. 6, 1998) (on file with author).
85. See, e.g., Treaty with the Creek Indians, June 14, 1866, U.S.-Creek Nation of Indians, 14
Stat. 785-92; Treaty with the Sioux Indians, Apr. 29, 1868, U.S.-Tribes of Sioux Indians, 15 Stat. 635-
47. For a complete appendix of ratified Indian treaties see FRANcts PAULPRUcHA, AMERICAN INDIAN
TREATIES: THE HISTORY OF A POLMCAL ANOMALY 446-500 (1994).
86. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 49 (1831).
87. In 1871, Congress ended treaty-making with the Indian tribes: "no Indian nation or tribe with-
in the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation,
tribe or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty." Act of Mar. 3, 1871, ch. 120,
§ 3, 16 Stat. 544, 570 (1871) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994)).
88. The plenary power doctrine has been appropriately referred to as "the most obvious example
of the legal legacy of colonialism," because it lacks constitutional sources. Robert N. Clinton,
Redressing the Legacy of Conquest: A Vision Quest for a Decolonized Federal Indian Law, 46 ARtK. L.
REV. 77, 110 (1993); see also DAVID E. W iuuuNs, AMERcAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME
COURT: THE MASKING OF JUS'rCE 25-27 (1997); Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Algebra of Federal Indian
Law: The Hard Trail of Decolonizing and Americanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence, 1986
Wis. L. REv. 219, 260 (1986).
89. See supra Part III.
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concerns addressed in Hilton and the Restatements are already embodied
in the federal system.
B. FEDERAL QUESTION JURISDICTION AND THE TRIBAL ABSTENTION
DOCTRINE
For a question of such political and practical significance, there are
surprisingly few tribal court recognition cases in the federal system.
This is partially explained by the fact that federal courts set aside many
tribal court cases on jurisdictional grounds before a tribal court hears the
merits of the case.90 For this reason, a discussion of tribal court recogni-
tion necessarily includes consideration of tribal adjudicatory jurisdiction
as well as the tribal abstention doctrine.
In 1985, the United State Supreme Court ruled, in National Farmers
Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians,9 1 that a federal
question 92 exists when a tribal court's exercise of jurisdiction is
challenged. 93 At issue in National Farmers was whether the Crow Tribal
Court could exercise jurisdiction over a tort claim involving a
non-Indian that arose on state-owned lands within the reservation
boundaries. The Court ruled that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction and
the case never proceeded to the merits.94 The Court reasoned that tribal
authority had been somewhat divested over time, and it was federal law
that must dictate the extent of such divestiture. 95 Specifically, the Court
stated:
The question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to
compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil
jurisdiction of a tribal court is one that must be answered by
reference to federal law and is a "federal question" under [28
U.S.C.] § 1331. Because petitioners contend that federal law
has divested the Tribe of this aspect of sovereignty, it is federal
law on which they rely as a basis for the asserted right of
90. National Farmers Union Insurance Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985), is
demonstrative. National Farmers was initiated in tribal court. See id. at 847. After the tribal court
determined it had jurisdiction, the losing party challenged jurisdiction in federal district court. See
National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 560 F. Supp 213 (D. Mont. 1983), rev'd,
763 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). After "four years and six judicial opinions
from four different courts," the parties reached a pretrial settlement. See Koehn, supra note 20, at
714.
91. 471 U.S. 845 (1985).
92. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Consti-
tution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994). See generally WRIGHT ET AL.,
FEDERAL PRACICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISmICnON 2D § 3579 (1984).
93. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 858.
94. See id.; Koehn, supra note 20, at 714.
95. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 852-53.
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freedom from Tribal Court interference. They have, therefore,
filed an action "arising under" federal law within the meaning
of [28 U.S.C.] § 1331.96
Because petitioners asserted a "right of freedom from Tribal Court inter-
ference," the Supreme Court ruled that they had filed an action arising
under federal law. 97
The ruling in National Farmers fundamentally altered the tribal
courts' stature within the federal system. It subjects all tribal court
causes of action to federal review any time there is a challenge to tribal
adjudicatory authority. On a hierarchical level, this relegates tribal
courts to the role of magistrate to the federal district courts on issues of
jurisdiction. By contrast, objections to a state court's claim of civil
adjudicatory jurisdiction may be reviewed only upon the Supreme
Court's grant of certiorari. The federal district courts are not ordinarily
available for such challenges to state court power. Despite this conceptu-
al diminution of tribal court stature, National Farmers also implemented
a policy of deference toward tribal court preliminary determinations of
jurisdictional issues, known as the tribal abstention doctrine.98 This
doctrine requires federal courts to refrain from exercising jurisdiction
until the tribal court is afforded an opportunity to rule on its own
jurisdiction. Although the tribal court's decision on jurisdiction is
reviewed de novo by the federal court, the exhaustion doctrine, based on
domestic comity, 99 suggests a mutual respect between the tribal and
federal courts. 100 State courts differ, however, on whether the exhaustion
rule is to be considered substantive federal law, and therefore binding in
state courts.101
Decided two years after National Farmers, Iowa Mutual Insurance
Co. v. LaPlante 102 invoked diversity jurisdiction in a tort claim initiated
in the Blackfeet Tribal Court. Extending the deference required by
National Farmers' exhaustion doctrine, the Court dismissed the case,
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Deference Owed Tribal Courts' Jurisdictional Determinations:
Towards Co-Existence, Understanding, and Respect Between Different Cultural and Judicial Norms, 24
N.M. L. REV. 191, 194-98 (1994) (citing National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 855-58).
99. See infra Part V.B.
100. In National Farmers, the United States Supreme Court stated: "Exhaustion of tribal court
remedies, moreover, will encourage tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise basis for
accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such
matters in the event of further judicial review." 471 U.S. at 857.
101. See Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 61 (Conn. 1998) (holding tribal exhaustion doctrine is
binding on state courts). But see Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 290-92 (Minn. 1996).
102. 480 U.S. 9 (1987).
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effectively disallowing forum shopping between federal and tribal courts,
reasoning:
In diversity cases, as well as federal-question cases, uncondi-
tional access to the federal forum would place it in direct
competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the latter's
authority over reservation affairs. . . . Adjudication of such
matters by any non-tribal court also infringes upon tribal law
making authority, because tribal courts are best qualified to
interpret and apply tribal law.103
The tribal exhaustion doctrine sends a mixed federal directive to the
states, each of which must develop its own approach to tribal court recog-
nition. On one hand, the rule requiring federal courts to defer to prelimi-
nary jurisdiction rulings of tribal courts nurtures an environment of
respect for tribal courts. Simultaneously, however, federal courts solidify
a policy of extreme scrutiny before they will recognize tribal authority
to adjudicate. This skepticism encourages even greater disrespect from
states that have been the historical nemesis of tribal authority. 104
The level of deference coming out of National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual is, in some respect, no deference at all. It merely extends to
tribal courts the courtesy of the first glance to determine jurisdiction,
allows the development of a tribal court record, yet reviews de novo the
jurisdictional ruling.
IV. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT LAWS
In the absence of controlling federal law, substantive judgment
recognition is a matter of state law.105 Therefore, each state adopts its
own approach to tribal court judgment recognition. This section address-
es the controlling federal law with regard to tribal judgments, followed
by an assessment of the different state recognition approaches.
103. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
104. Having been referred to as the Indian tribes' "deadliest enemies," States have a long-
standing history of challenging tribal exercises of authority. United States v. Kagama 118 U.S. 375,
384 (1886). An unparalleled magnitude of federal Indian cases are the result of tribal-state conflict.
See, e.g., Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie Tribal Gov't, 522 U.S. 520 (1998); Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S. 450
(1995); Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Sac and Fox Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); California v. Cabazon
Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202 (1987); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of the Colville
Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973);
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (31 Pet.) 515, 561 (1832) (pledging federal protection).
105. See Somportex Ltd. v. Philadelphia Chewing Gum Corp., 453 F.2d 435,440 (3d Cir. 1971).
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A. FEDERALLY MANDATED FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Tribal governments have a pre-constitutional and extra-constitution-
al connection to the federal union,106 but the U.S. Constitution itself is
mostly silent as to tribes. As such, the notion that Indian tribes were
meant to be included within the federal full faith and credit scheme of
28 U.S.C. § 1738 is not widely accepted. l 0 7 The federal statute at issue
mandates full faith and credit for every "State, Territory, or Posses-
sion."1 0 8 Idaho and New Mexico are the only states that affirmatively
interpret tribes as "territories" that are unequivocally included within
the statute. 10 9 For their part, many tribal courts conclude they are not
bound to extend full faith and credit to state or federal judgments be-
cause 28 U.S.C. § 1738 imposes no obligation on tribal courts. 110 The
passage of specific federal laws extending full faith and credit to certain
tribal court decisions provides further legislative evidence that Congress
does not see tribal courts as within the general scope of 28 U.S.C. §
1738.111
Among the federal laws expressly requiring the states to give full
faith and credit to tribal court decisions are the Indian Child Welfare
Act, 112 the Violence Against Women Act, 11 3 and the Full Faith and Credit
for Child Support Orders Act (Child Support Orders Act).11 4 The
106. See WILKNS, supra note 88, at 21-22.
107. See Clinton, supra note 21, at 936. Representing the minority view, Professor Clinton argues
that tribal court judgments are entitled to full faith and credit under 28 U.S.C. § 1738, and that tribes
are consequently obligated under the same legislation to extend full faith and credit to the states. See
Clinton, supra note 21, at 936. But see P.S. Deloria & Robert Laurence, Negotiating Tribal-State Full
Faith and Credit Agreements: The Topology of the Negotiation and the Merits of the Question, 28 GA.
L. REv. 365, 367-80 (1994); discussion supra note 27.
108. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994).
109. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 902 (Idaho 1982) ("[W]e agree with those courts
which have found the phrase "Territories and Possessions" broad enough to include Indian tribes, at
least as they are presently constituted under the laws of the United States."); Jim v. CIT Fin. Servs.
Corp., 527 P.2d 1222, 1228 (N.M. Ct. App. 1974) ("[T]he use of the term "territory" in Section 1738
... is broad enough to include the Navajo Indian Tribe.").
110. See discussion supra note 27.
111. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 809 (9th Cir. 1997). One would not expect
Congress to specifically check each act to include tribal court decisions if such decisions were part of
the general policy stated in 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
112. 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1994). The Indian Child Welfare Act was enacted to prevent the
wholesale separation of Indian children from their families and communities. See Indian Child Wel-
fare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7530. In the late 1960s, it is estimated that
between 25% and 35% of Indian children were removed from their homes. See id. at 7531. This high
rate of removal was considered a threat to tribal survival: "no resource ... is more vital to continued
existence and integrity of Indian tribes than their children and the United States has a direct interest, as
trustee, in protecting Indian children who are niembers of or are eligible for membership in an Indian
tribe." 25 U.S.C. § 1901(3) (1994).
113. Pub. L. No. 103-322, it. IV, 108 Stat. 1902 (1994) (codified as 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (1994)).
114. Pub. L. No. 103-383. 108 Stat. 4063 (codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994 & Supp. IV
1998)).
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Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act 115 has been held to require full faith
and credit to tribal court orders, although the congressional mandate is
merely implicit. 116
The Indian Child Welfare Act's full faith and credit provision
requires state and federal courts to extend full faith and credit to tribal
court child placement orders.117 The Violence Against Women Actl18
and the Child Support Orders Act"l 9 provisions require all courts,
including tribal courts, to extend full faith and credit to orders under
each respective enactment.120
B. COMITY IN THE FEDERAL COURTS
When tribal court judgments fall outside the scope of these specific
federal mandates, however, a growing number of state and federal courts
apply principles of comity to tribal court decisions.121 But there are two
distinct applications for the term "comity" that must be distinguished
for this discussion. Domestic comity applies only within our federal
union and ensures that jurisdictions will honor the laws of other jurisdic-
tions as a matter of deference and mutual respect under an umbrella of
federal law. International comity, on the other hand, is the recognition
that one nation allows within its territory to the judicial acts of another
nation out of regard for principles of international law, political under-
standings of reciprocity, and concern for the rights of its own citizens. 122
This distinction between domestic and international comity is important
to tribal court review because applying both is inconsistent. Domestic
comity welcomes tribes into the federal judicial fraternity, albeit as a little
brother or sister. Applying international comity to recognize tribal
judgments, by contrast, suggests an insider-outsider relationship.
Comity within the domestic sphere refers to a spirit of cooperation
within our federal union; it requires cooperation of all sovereigns
whether federal, state, or tribal. Domestic comity explains various absten-
tion doctrines by which judicial policy precludes one court's interfer-
ence with the judicial proceedings of another jurisdiction. Younger v.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
116. See discussion infra Part V.B.
117. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1994).
118. 18 U.S.C. § 2265(a) (1994).
119. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
120. See discussion infra Part V.B.
121. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 807 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a district court
should use the principles of comity to determine recognition and enforcement of a tort judgment from
a tribal court).
122. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 227-28 (1895).
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Harris123 sets forth the federal-state abstention doctrine, and National
Farmers establishes the federal-tribal abstention requirement.124
Abstention in both instances is justified by comity and premised on
the notion that federal courts should have the power to enjoin the actions
of state or tribal governments only in extraordinary circumstances. 125 In
ordinary circumstances, the federal court should stay its hand and refrain
from interference, affording the state or tribal government deference as a
sovereign deserving respect, even at the expense of federal power.
Current expressions of domestic comity lack a historic source. Although
the principle conserves and allocates judicial resources within the system,
scholars point out that the principle of comity within our federal system
has no constitutional or legislative basis.126 Domestic comity
considerations also lie at the heart of habeas review. Habeas review of
state authority is authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and, as to tribal
authority, at 25 U.S.C. § 1303, each requiring exhaustion of remedies, a
requirement imposed as a matter of comity.127 Domestic comity plays a
role not only in federal-state or federal-tribal review, but also within the
federal government in terms of administrative review. 128
International comity, as defined in Hilton, refers to the recognition
of foreign proceedings, which contemplates courts that are clearly
outside the scope of "our federalism."1 29 International comity is
afforded to foreign courts upon a showing that the foreign court had
competent jurisdiction, and that the laws and public policy of the review-
ing jurisdiction and the rights of its citizens will not be violated. Interna-
tional comity pertains to courts over which our laws exercise no control.
This lack of control justifies any refusal to recognize decisions from
courts that do not share minimum norms of fair process or that pursue
policies substantially different from our domestic choices. Within the
federal system, application of Hilton's comity is unnecessary because all
123. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
124. National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985).
125. In Younger, federal courts retain the power to enjoin state officers from instituting criminal
action in special circumstances, such as the protection of constitutional rights. See Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971); see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908) (holding that Minnesota
Attorney General Young was properly enjoined from enforcing an unconstitutional state law).
Likewise, in the Indian law context, federal courts could enjoin tribal officers if officers were acting
in bad faith or in violation of express prohibitions of federal law. See National Farmers, 471 U.S. at
856 n.21.
126. LAURENCE H. TIMi, AmERICAN CONSTTIONAL LAW § 3-28 (3d ed. 2000); Joanne C. Brant,
Taking the Constitution Supreme Court at Its Word: The Implications for RFRA and Separation of
Powers, 56 MoNT. L. REv. 5, 25 (1995).
127. See Exparte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886).
128. See generally Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S.
837 (1984). Professor Alex Tallchief Skibine suggests that federal courts apply the same standard of
review in tribal court review as in administrative review. See Skibine, supra note 98, at 221.
129. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895).
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courts within the federal union, including tribal courts, are subject to
minimum due process requirements and are subject to federal review to
enforce fundamental policy principles.
Further, there is no need to retain a public policy exception to tribal
court review when, according to the prevailing federal interpretation,
Congress has the "plenary" authority to enforce policy directives upon
tribal governments. 130 Wilson nonetheless suggests a federal court as a
means for non-recognition could use the public policy:
Whether a district court may, in the exercise of its discretion,
reject a judgment for lack of reciprocity is a question we leave
for another day. Although best left to our sister branches of
government, there may be an appropriate case in which the
record demonstrates significant public policy factors which
might be sufficient for the district court to consider reciprocity
under the "public policy" discretionary exception.131
Domestic comity is the only sensible framework within the context
of the federal-tribal relationship that presently exists. The doctrine of
international comity, when applied to tribal decisions, imposes an overly
rigid set of guidelines, which have no legitimate function with a federal
union. The safeguards that international comity embodies are addressed
well before a final tribal judgment is entered through minimum due
process requirements and the availability of federal review.
C. STATE APPROACHES
Over the past two decades, many states, particularly in the western
United States, have developed laws, policies and procedures for recogni-
tion and enforcement of tribal court judgments. Although in some
regards these explicit statements of standards represent a positive step
forward,132 substantial state involvement in Indian law may diminish the
central role of a federal Indian law that has historically excluded states as
policymakers.
Many unresolved issues remain. Should states entertain issues such
as tribal court recognition, when such are so fundamentally bound to
perceptions of tribal governmental legitimacy? Is it appropriate for
states to make decisions that bear so directly on the political relationship
between the federal union and Indian nations?
130. But see discussion of "plenary power," supra note 88.
131. Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 812 n.7 (9th Cir. 1997).
132. Positive dialogues between tribes and the federal judiciary are ongoing in the Eighth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits.
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The lack of a broad federal mandate on recognition of tribal judg-
ments creates a chaotic environment within which each state implements
its own approach, if at all. Of the states that have addressed the question
legislatively or by court rule, several restrict the applicability of the
policy to tribes geographically located within their borders. 133 The
practical implications of such a policy are self-evident. For instance, a
party bound by a tribal court judgment within the geographic boun-
daries of State A travels to State B. If enforcement is sought in State B,
and State B has not articulated a policy for recognizing judgments of
tribes beyond its boundaries, recognition and enforcement is crippled by
uncertainty as procedural and substantive law that could render the tribal
judgment meaningless.
Recognition of judgments should not be a product of one state's
relationship with local tribes, but should be an outgrowth of the federal-
tribal relationship as a whole. Full faith and credit rests on binding
co-equal sovereigns who share common political identity and unity in
federal structure. The international approach, by contrast, allows states
to act as sovereigns in their dealings with political outsiders.
Whatever the governing concept or even the explicit standard, it is
the practical reality that the majority of states do not extend full faith
and credit to tribes. In some cases, a state's laws on the subject cause
additional hostility by employing language that suggests tribal court
inferiority or illegitimacy. This section surveys the four categories of
approaches currently adopted by the states: (1) absence of a compre-
hensive policy; (2) judicial extension of international comity standards
by analogizing tribes to foreign countries; (3) extension of comity as
defined by statute or court rule; and (4) extension of full faith and credit
to tribal courts as if they were states or territories.
1. Absence of a Generally Applicable Policy
In the mid-1980s, a survey of possible approaches to state court
recognition of tribal judgments might have included a group of states
that simply ignored tribal court adjudication.1 34 Today, as a result of
federal legislation requiring states to recognize certain kinds of tribal
court judgments, this approach has theoretically disappeared. Congress
133. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-09 (Supp. 1999); WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (1998); Wyo. STAT.
ANN. § 5-1-111 (Michie 1999).
134. See Gordon K. Wright, Note, Recognition of Tribal Decisions in State Courts, 37 STAN. L.
REV. 1397, 1409 (1985). Wright raised, yet discouraged, the possibility that states could adopt a policy
of disregarding tribal court decisions altogether. See id. Such a policy could have been facilitated at
that time given that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 was the only law expressly requiring states
to grant full faith and credit to tribal court proceedings. See 25 U.S.C. § 1911(d) (1994).
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requires states to extend full faith and credit to tribal courts decisions at
the least in a limited number of subject matter areas, including child
custody proceedings,135 domestic violence protection orders, 136 and child
support awards. 137
States that have no recognition policy apart from the subject
matter areas addressed by federal legislation fall under this classification.
Illinois,138 for example, has no statutes, reported case decisions, or judi-
cial standards addressing tribal court recognition. Other states under this
classification have passed laws that simply mirror the federal mandates,
including Arkansas, 139 Kansas, 140 Missouri, 141 Nevada, 142 North Caro-
lina,143 Tennessee,144 Texas,145 Utah, 146 Vermont, 147 Virginia,148 and West
Virginia.149 Colorado is grouped in this category for lack of a policy of
general applicability, although the state's traffic code provides that a
tribal court conviction constitutes a past conviction for consideration in
subsequent state sentencing proceedings.150
Many states under this classification have adopted the Uniform
Interstate Family Support Act (Family Support Act),'S' which extends
135. See id.
136. See Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C § 2265 (1994); see also The Indian
Land Consolidation Act, 25 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2211 (1994); The Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act, 25
U.S.C. § 1725(g) (1994).
137. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
138. Although Illinois does not have a policy of general applicability for the recognition or en-
forcement of tribal court judgments, the state courts on a case-by-case basis have exhibited a friendly
relationship toward tribal court jurisdiction in Indian Child Welfare Act cases. Illinois courts, unlike
other jurisdictions, have been receptive to transfer of proceedings to tribal courts when appropriate.
See In re Armell, 550 N.E.2d 1060, 1069 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990).
139. See ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-15-302 (Michie 1998) (protection orders).
140. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3843 (Supp. 1999) (protection orders).
141. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 455.067 (West Supp. 2000) (protection orders).
142. Nevada mirrors federal legislation by extending full faith and credit to tribal court domestic
violence protection orders. See NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33.090 (Michie Supp. 1999). Similar treat-
ment is extended to tribal court custody proceedings involving Indian children. See NEV. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 62.170 (Michie Supp. 1999).
143. North Carolina extends full faith and credit to tribal court protective orders. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50B-4 (1999).
144. Tennessee recognizes tribal court protective orders. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-3-622
(Supp. 1999).
145. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 71.008 (West Supp. 2000) (protective orders).
146. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-36-1 and 30-6-4 (1998) (protective orders).
147. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1030, 1101 (1989) (protective orders).
148. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-152.10 (Michie Supp. 1999) (protective orders).
149. See W. VA. CODE § 48-2A-3 (1999) (protective orders).
150. See COL. REV. STAT. § 42-2-127 (1999).
151. See ALA. CODE § 30-3-1 (1989); ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-17-101 (Michie 1998); DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 13 § 601 (1998); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 88.1011 (West Supp. 2000); GA. CODE. ANN. §§
19-11-101, 19- 6-26 (1998); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-18 (Michie 1997); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 23-9 (1995);
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 407.5101 (Michie 1999); LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 141, ch.c. (West 1999); MD.
CODE ANN., FAM. LAW. § 4-508.1 (1999); MASS: GEN. LAWS ch. 209D § 1-101 (1998); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 93-25-3 (1999); Mo. REV. STAT. § 454.850 (Supp. 2000); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 546-B:1 (Supp.
1999); OIuo RV. CODE ANN. § 3115.01 (Anderson Supp. 1999); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 7101 (West
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full faith and credit to tribal court alimony and support orders. 152 With
regard to child support orders, the Family Support Act mirrors the
federal mandate of the Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders
Act (Child Support Orders Act).153 The Child Support Orders Act
includes Indian country in the definition of "states" entitled to full faith
and credit. 154 The Family Support Act somewhat expands the Child
Support Orders Act by including alimony support orders as well as the
federally mandated child support orders.155
It is vitally important for the uniform acts to expressly include tribes
if their general purposes of national uniformity of laws are to be
realized. Perhaps the act that most needs to incorporate tribes if it is to
carry out its policies is the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act
(Child Custody Act).1 56 The purpose of the Child Custody Act is to
discourage state-to-state forum shopping by dissatisfied litigants in
custody battles and, by extension, to discourage parental kidnapping.157
Including tribal courts within the meaning of the Child Custody Act is
vital because it reaches beyond the scope of the Indian Child Welfare
Act. Specifically, the Indian Child Welfare Act does not apply to custo-
dy proceedings between parents. In its current manifestation the Child
Custody Act does not expressly apply to tribes, leaving the issue for
differing interpretations.
At least two of the states under this classification have taken steps to
create a strong relationship between state and tribal courts by authorizing
state court judges to certify questions to tribal courts in order to deter-
mine the applicable tribal law.158 This mechanism promotes tribal
self-governance because it lessens the possibility of an incorrect interpre-
tation of tribal law, and communicates inter-sovereign respect.
2. Common Law International Comity
Many states apply international standards by analogizing tribes to
foreign countries. Judicially crafted comity rules are distinguished from
comity embodied in statutes or court administrative rules. Common law
Supp. 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-23.1-101 (Supp. 1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45f-101 (Supp. 1999);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15B, § 101 (Supp. 1999); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-279.1, 20-88.32 (Michie Supp.
1999); W.VA. CODE § 48b-1-101 (1999).
152. Alimony and child support orders from tribal courts are recognized under Tennessee's
uniform support act. See TENN. CODE. ANN. § 36-5-2101 (Supp. 1999).
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994 & Supp. IV 1998). The Child Support Orders Act provides for full
faith and credit for child support orders, including orders from Indian country, as defined at 18 U.S.C.
§ 1151.
154. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738B.
155. See Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, § 101, 9 U.L.A. 256-58 (1996).
156. See 9 U.L.A. 123 (1988).
157. See id. § 1, 9 U.L.A. 123-24.
158. See MD. CODE ANN., Crs. &JUD. PROC. § 12-601 (1998); W. VA. CODE § 51-IA-2, 51-IA-3
(1998).
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comity tends to be more flexible and consequently less predictable in its
application.
Montana and Oregon courts analogize tribal courts to the courts of
foreign nations in the spirit of Hilton.159 Montana, however, does not
specify the prerequisites that will be considered before recognition is
extended. It is unclear, for instance, whether Montana courts will require
tribal court reciprocity. On one hand, the reciprocity requirement has all
but vanished from our foreign country recognition jurisprudence, 160 yet
if Hilton is the only authority cited, it is unclear whether recognition
could be denied for lack of reciprocity even though all other conditions
are met.
Montana's decisions generally involve enforcement of tribal money
judgments as exemplified by Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe. 161 The Wippert
standard was most recently revisited in Anderson v. Engleke, 162 a case in
which enforcement was denied, not on the basis that the tribal court
judgment was invalid, but because the state lacked authority to enforce as
to on-reservation assets. 163
Montana's courts have recognized tribal orders as a matter of full
faith and credit under the Child Support Orders Act by. affirming the
authority of the state's Child Support Enforcement Division to enforce
tribal court judgments without initiating special enforcement proceed-
ings under Wippert.164 The Montana courts are careful to note, however,
that tribal court orders, judgments, and decrees that do not involve child
support are not entitled to full faith and credit, but are subject to the
Wippert standard of scrutiny under an international comity analysis. 165
Minnesota has adopted an international comity approach, but with
less clarity. Recognition was denied in Desjarlait v. Desjarlait,166 a
marriage dissolution proceeding, due to lack of jurisdiction.167 However,
the court of appeal's only policy pronouncement was to decline to
159. See Wippert v. Blackfeet Tribe, 654 P.2d 512, 514 (Mont. 1982); Red Fox v. Red Fox, 542
P.2d 918, 920 (Or. Ct. App. 1975); discussion on Hilton standards, supra note 13.
160. See discussion on reciprocity requirement, supra Part IV.B.
161. 654 P.2d 512, 514 (Mont. 1982).
162. 954 P.2d 1106 (Mont. 1998).
163. See Anderson v. Engleke, 954 P.2d 1106, 1112 (Mont. 1998). Litigants potentially encounter
serious problems when their judgments involve non-Indian fee land or non-Indian assets located on the
reservation. On one hand, the tribe might not retain regulatory authority to seize these assets, but if the
state refuses to exercise such authority, the tribal court judgment is unenforceable.
164. See Day v. State, 900 P.2d 296, 300 (Mont. 1995) (enforcing tribal court child support
award under 28 U.S.C. § 1738B(b) (1994). Montana's legislature has codified the federal mandate.
See MONT. CODE. ANN. § 25-9-602(1), (2) (1999).
165. See Day, 900 P.2d at 301.
166. 379 N.W.2d 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
167. See Desjarlait v. Desjarlait, 379 N.W.2d 139, 145 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
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include tribes within the federal full faith and credit scheme. 168 The
court held "[t]he full faith and credit clause of the federal constitution is
inapplicable because it expressly applies to matters between states, not to
matters between tribal courts and states." 169 They did not go on to
outline a tribal judgment recognition policy.
With respect to uniform acts, Minnesota policy is even less clear.
On the one hand, the Child Custody Act has been interpreted to exclude
tribal courts, 170 but state courts have declined jurisdiction in the favor of
tribal courts 171 to safeguard the general purposes of both the Parental
Kidnapping Prevention Act and the Child Custody Act. A dialogue
between tribal leaders and the Minnesota judiciary is presently underway
and will perhaps clarify practice in the state. 172
The Arizona courts also decline tribal court judgments the same
full faith and credit as sister states, 173 and opt instead for an international
comity approach. 174 This approach is likely be codified when a pro-
posed court rule is presented for final approval.1 75 Arizona's proposed
rule is the result of a ten-year process of study and negotiation, the final
product of which mirrors the mandatory and discretionary grounds for
recognition pronounced in Wilson. 176 If adopted, the Arizona rule will
apply to all federally recognized tribes and place the burden of proof on
the objecting party. 177
The most recent states to adopt this approach are New Jersey and
Connecticut, each applying comity to recognizing money judgments
entered by the Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court.178 It is important to
168. See id. at 144.
169. Id. at 144.
170. See id. at 143. The Court referred to language of the Minnesota Child Custody Act which
did not expressly include tribes. See id. (citing MINN. STAT. § 518A (1984)).
171. See In re Custody of K.K.S., 508 N.W.2d 813, 814 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
172. This dialogue has not always proceeded smoothly. Personnel changes in the state judiciary
have produced differing political views with regard to tribal court recognition. See Pat Doyle, Judges
Ponder Writing State Rule to Enforce Tribal Orders, STAR-TRIBUNE (Minneapolis-St. Paul), May 4,
1998 at IA.
173. See Begay v. Miller, 222 P.2d 624, 628 (Ariz. 1950).
174. See Tracy v. Superior Court, 810 P.2d 1030, 1041 (Ariz. 1991); Lynch v. Olsen, 377 P.2d
199, 201 (Ariz. 1962); Leon v. Numkena, 689 P.2d 566, 570 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1984); Brown v. Babbitt
Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 694-95 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977).
175. See Petition for Adoption of Rules of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Judg-
ments (submitted to Ariz. Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 1998 by Michael C. Nelson, Chairman, Arizona Court
Forum) (on file with author). The forum was initiated in 1989 as a project of the Conference of Chief
Justices of the State Supreme Courts, but has expanded to include tribal and federal representatives.
See id.
176. See Wilson v. Marchington, 127 F.3d 805, 815 (9th Cir. 1997).
177. See Proposed Rules of Procedure for the Recognition of Tribal Court Judgments, at Rule 4
(submitted to Ariz. Sup. Ct. Nov. 19, 1998 by Michael C. Nelson, Chairman, Arizona Court Forum)
[hereinafter Proposed Rules] (on file with author).
178. See Mashantucket Pequot Gaming Enter. v. Maihorta, 740 A.2d 703 (N.J. 1999); Mashan-
tucket Pequot Gaming Enter. v. Dimasi, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. 474 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999).
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note, however, that in both cases, the petitioner sought recognition under
comity principles rather than seeking full faith and credit. 179
3. Codified Versions of Comity
States that have codified their policy and procedures in the form of
a statute or court rule constitute a separate category. Although many
states dignify their policy with a "full faith and credit" title, most are
more akin to international comity standards.
South Dakota's statute, for example, adopts the general categories
of factors set out in Hilton, minus the reciprocity requirement.180 But
the statute's standard is far more difficult to meet than the typical inter-
national comity analysis.'S' Although the premise for foreign judgment
recognition is that a judgment should be enforced absent a showing of a
lapse in due process safeguards, the South Dakota statute reverses the
premise and presumes invalidity. The tribal court judgment will not be
recognized unless the party seeking recognition establishes compliance
with the standards, by a clear and convincing proof. Reviewing juris-
dictions typically place the burden of proof on the party waging the
collateral attack, in contrast to South Dakota's statute.
The case of Red Fox v. Hettich182 is demonstrative. In determining
that a tribal court tort judgment would not be recognized under the
statute, the South Dakota Supreme Court held only that the plaintiff had
failed to meet the requisite burden.183 The South Dakota Supreme Court
did not conclude, nor suggest, that the tribal court lacked personal or
subject matter jurisdiction, nor did the court find a defect in process or
suspect fraud.' 8 4 The South Dakota Supreme Court simply suggested
that there was a failure to meet the clear and convincing standard based
on a question of whether the tribe's legislature could have extended
regulatory jurisdiction over the non-Indian defendant's conduct of
allowing his horses to roam free on a highway within the reservation
179. See Malhorta, 740 A.2d at 705; Dimasi, 25 Conn. L. Rptr. at n.l.
180. See S.D. CODIED LAWS § 1-1-25 (Michie 1992).
181. See id. Recognition, under this statute, is only proper when the state court is convinced that:
(1) the tribal court had subject matter and personal jurisdiction; (2) the judgment was procured without
fraud; (3) the tribal court's processes were impartial with due notice and hearing; (4) the judgment
complied with tribal law; and (5) the judgment does not contravene South Dakota's public policy. See
id. § 1-1-25(1)(a)-(e).
182. 494 N.w.2d 638 (S.D. 1993).
183. See Red Fox v. Hettich, 494 N.W.2d 638, 647 (S.D. 1993).
184. See generally id.
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boundaries. 8 5 Under an international comity analysis, the judgment
undoubtedly would have been recognized.
At one time, Washington courts affirmatively held that tribal court
decrees were entitled to full faith and credit to the same extent afforded
to sister states. 186 Washington, like South Dakota, has retreated over time
to become more restrictive. The state has since adopted a court rule that
addresses both jurisdictional disputes between the state and tribes, and
procedures for recognition.187 Recognition and enforcement applies to
any federally recognized tribe unless the tribal court (1) lacked juris-
diction, (2) failed to comply with the due process requirements of the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, or (3) failed to provide reciprocal
recognition and enforcement of Washington judgments.188  If the court
determines the tribe has exclusive jurisdiction, it is bound to dismiss the
state court action unless federal law mandates a transfer of proceed-
ings.189 If the state court finds concurrent jurisdiction with the tribal
court, it may (but need not), transfer proceedings to the tribe. Con-
siderations such as the nature of the action, the interests of the parties,
convenience of forum and the availability of tribal court remedies are
prescribed. 190
North Dakota's approach was adopted in 1995 as a result of a
forum between tribal and state judges. The standard was established by a
court rule rather than by legislative or common lawl 9l The rule derives
from a state constitutional provision that directs the North Dakota
judicial system to consider Indian tribes as the equivalent of foreign
nations for purposes of recognition.192 North Dakota's rule embodies
the usual conditions of international comity, such as finality, proper
procedure and jurisdiction, and an absence of fraud, yet preserves a
public policy exception.193 The burden of proof, unlike South Dakota's
approach, rests upon the objecting party. 194 The rule seeks to promote
reciprocity from the tribes, but is progressive in contrast to other states
185. See generally id. The South Dakota Supreme Court referred to the Montana test for regula-
tory and legislative jurisdiction to question whether the defendant's contact had a detrimental effect on
the health, welfare, or economic security of the tribe as a whole. See id. at 647 (citing Montana v.
United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981)).
186. See In re Adoption of Buehl, 555 P.2d 1334 (1976). The court in Buehl adopted New
Mexico's policy as defined in Jim v. CIT Financial Services Corp., 533 P.2d 751, 752 (N.M. 1975).
See Buehl, 555 P.2d at 1342.
187. See WASH. Sup. CT. R. 82.5 (1997). The rule was enacted in 1995. See id.
188. See id. at 82.5(c).
189. See id. at 82.5(a).
190. See id. at 82.5(b).
191. See N.D. R. CT. 7.2 (2000).
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because reciprocity is not a prerequisite to recognition and finality is
presumed. 195
In 1991, prior to the adoption of the court rule, the North Dakota
legislature enacted a statute for the reciprocal recognition of certain state
and tribal court judgments that placed a series of conditions on the tribal
courts. 196 The statute did not limit the court's discretion to recognize
and enforce tribal court judgments as a matter of comity, but limited the
state court's discretion to deny enforcement. 197
Michigan's court rule198 corresponds to that of North Dakota and
also results from a forum between tribal and state court officials. Michi-
gan's court rule applies to all federally recognized tribes rather than
limiting the applicability to the tribes within the state. 199 The Michigan
rule is, however, contingent on the tribe proving to the state that it will
offer reciprocal recognition. 200 Michigan presumes the tribal court judg-
ment to be valid and the objecting party has the burden of raising the
standard defenses. 201
Wyoming's policy is defined legislatively under what is entitled
"full faith and credit for tribal acts and records," and applies only to the
Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapaho Tribes. 202 Despite the title, this
statute is more appropriately classified as a comity statute because it
includes a list of conditions and prerequisites to recognition and enforce-
ment, including authentication requirements for tribal documents. 203
The statute requires a showing that the tribal court is a court of record204
and allows the state court to examine the record keeping procedures of
195. See id.
196. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-09 (Supp. 1999).
197. See Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschman Ford, 462 N.W.2d 164, 169 (N.D. 1990). In a decision
prior to the enactment of North Dakota's present court rule, but after the legislative enactment, a tribal
court judgment was recognized and enforced under principles of international comity. See id While
recognizing a difference between tribal courts and courts of foreign countries, the Fredericks court
cited Hilton and South Dakota's Mexican Bear decision to apply the similar principles. See id. at
170-71.
The statutory provisions promoted enforcement of tribal court judgments, but only required
enforcement of judgments from the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation, which
involved divorce, child custody, adoption, protective orders and juvenile neglect proceedings. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-01-09. Enforcement under the Act was conditioned on reciprocity and
required that the issuing tribal court judge be law trained and admitted to at least one state bar. See id
198. MicH. Cr. R. 2.615 (1998).
199. See id. at 2.615(A).
200. See id. at 2.615(B)(1)-(2). The tribe is required to provide the State Court Administrative
Office with a copy of the tribal statute or court rule which obligates the tribe to enforce Michigan's
judgments. See id.
201. See id. at 2.615(C).
202. See Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111 (Michie 1999).
203. See Darby L. Hoggatt, Comment, The Wyoming Tribal Full Faith and Credit Act: Enforcing
Tribal Judgments and Protecting Tribal Sovereignty, 30 LAND & WATER L. REV. 531, 552-54 (1995).
204. See § 5-1-111(a)(I)(ii).
2000] 343
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
the tribal court. 205 The statute places requirements on the very structure
of the tribal court system, requiring appellate review and special tribal
court contempt proceedings. 206 Wyoming places the burden on the
party challenging recognition. 207
Wisconsin's legislature also inappropriately labeled its tribal court
recognition statute 208 "full faith and credit," when the statute more
accurately embodies principles of comity. The Wisconsin statute mirrors
the language of the Wyoming statute, down to the recordation and
authentication requirements. 209 It applies to Wisconsin tribes only, but
differs from its counterparts in that the state court may, on its own
motion, raise a question as to the validity of a tribal court judgment. 210
All other state statutes and rules require collateral attacks by a party.
Prior to the enactment of the statute, Wisconsin courts declined to extend
full faith and credit to tribal courts, but recognized and enforced some
judgments as a matter of comity. 2 11
The Oklahoma legislature statutorily vested the state supreme court
with the power to issue standards to extend full faith and credit to
federally recognized and CFR courts.2 12 The final court rule213 author-
izes recognition on the condition that the tribe provides proof to the state
that the tribal court grants reciprocity to Oklahoma. 214 To date, only
205. See § 5-1-111 (c). Among the specific requirements of the state is that the tribal court keep
permanent records of its proceedings and make available transcripts or electronic recordings of all
tribal court proceedings. See id.
206. See id.
207. See Wis. STAT. § 806.245; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111.
208. WIS. STAT. § 806.245 (1998). The law took effect in 1994. See id. Recently, the statute
was applied to recognize a tribal default judgment. See Teague v. Bad River Band of the Lake
Superior Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 599 N.W.2d 911 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
209. See Wis. STAT. § 806.245; Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 5-1-111.
210. See Wis. STAT. § 806.245.
In determining whether a tribal court judgment is a valid judgment, the circuit court on its
own motion or on the motion of a party, may examine the tribal court record to assure
that (a) The tribal court had jurisdiction . . . (b) The judgment is final . . . (c) The
judgment is on the merits. (d) The judgment was procured without fraud; duress or
coercion. (f) The proceedings of the tribal court complied with the Indian civil rights act
[sic] of 1968...
§ 806.245(4).
211. See, e.g., Sengstock v. San Carlos Apache Tribe, 477 N.W.2d 310, 314 (Wis. Ct. App.
1991).
212. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 728 (West 2000). The statute became effective 1992 and
gave the Oklahoma Supreme Court the power to develop standards which would extend recognition, in
whole, or part, to tribal courts, so long as the tribal courts grant reciprocity to Oklahoma. See id.
§ 728(B); Dennis W. Arrow, Oklahoma's Tribal Courts: A Prologue, The First Fifteen Years of the
Modern Era, and a Glimpse at the Road Ahead, 19 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REV. 5, 62 (1994) (providing a
discussion of the history behind the present Oklahoma court rule).
213. OKLA. Dis-r. Crs. R. 30.
214. Of Oklahoma's 34 tribes, only four tribal courts and 10 CFR courts in Oklahoma have
registered a reciprocity affirmation with the Oklahoma Supreme Court. Oklahoma's Full Faith and
Credit Tribal Court Index (on file with Administrative Office of the Courts, State of Oklahoma). Okla-
homa's Full Faith and Credit Tribal Court Index presently lists the following tribes, in order of registra
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one reported case, Barrett v. Barrett,2 15 addresses the recognition is-
sue.2 16 The court's decision whether or not to recognize the decree was
not a matter of right, but required the court to consider whether the
Citizen Band Potawatomi Tribe grants reciprocity to Oklahoma courts. 217
The case was eventually remanded to the lower court to allow the attack-
ing party to present evidence of fraud in procurement of her consent to
the tribal court's jurisdiction,218 despite the fact that the fraud issue had
been previously litigated in the tribal appellate and trial courts.
4. True "Full Faith and Credit"
Only Idaho and New Mexico afford full faith and credit to tribal
courts. Both states adopt the minority view that places tribes within the
meaning of "territories" under 28 U.S.C. § 1738. New Mexico's
policy, first introduced in Jim v. CIT Financial Services Corp.,2 19 has
been repeatedly upheld even in the recognition of the controversial area
of tribal court punitive damage awards. 220
Idaho's Supreme Court addressed the question as a matter of first
impression in the 1982 divorce proceeding of Sheppard v. Sheppard,221
and has never revisited the issue. After a state court entered a divorce
decree, the non-Indian husband collaterally attacked a prior tribal court
adoption decree as invalid in an attempt to avoid his obligation to pay
child support. 222 The state court deemed the tribal court adoption
decree was valid and was entitled to recognition under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause to the U.S. Constitution and its own implementing
statute. 223 The state court reasoned that the phrase "territories and pos-
sessions" was broad enough to include tribal courts in their present
manifestation. 224 As a historical reference, the Idaho Supreme Court
cited Mackey as controlling authority. 225 The Idaho Supreme Court ex-
tended full faith and credit to the tribe despite the fact that the same
tion: Creek (Muscogee Nation), June 1. 1994; Seminole Nation, December 22, 1994; Kiowa Tribe,
April 6, 1995; Comanche Tribe, April 6. 1995; Wichita Tribe, April 6, 1995; Caddo Tribe, April 6,
1995; Delaware Tribe, April 6, 1995; Fort Sill Apache Tribe, April 6, 1995; Tonkawa Tribe, April 6,
1995; Cherokee Nation, May 26, 1995; Osage Nation, December 4, 1995; and Citizen Band Potawa-
tomi Nation, November 21, 1996. See id. No tribes outside of Oklahoma have ever registered. Seeid
215. 878 P.2d 1051 (Okla. 1994).
216. See David S. Clark, State Court Recognition of Tribal Court Judgments: Securing the
Blessings of Civilization, 23 OKLA. CmTY U. L. REV. 353, 356-60 (1998).
217. See Barrett v. Barrett, 878 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Okla. 1994).
218. See id. at 1056.
219. 533 P.2d 751 (N.M. 1975).
220. See Halwood v. Cowboy Auto Sales, Inc., 946 P.2d 1088, 1089 (N.M. Ct. App. 1997).
221. 655 P.2d-895 (Idaho 1982).
222. Sheppard v. Sheppard, 655 P.2d 895, 899-901 (Idaho 1982).
223. See id. at 901 (citing U.S. CoNsT. art IV, § 1; 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1994)).
224. See id. at 901-02.
225. See id.
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tribal court had previously ruled that it was not required to extend full
faith and credit to the state of Idaho, 226 refusing the reciprocity required
under many comity standards. In keeping with the judiciary's pro-
nouncements, Idaho's legislature adopted the Uniform Interstate Family
Support Act 227 extending the definition of "state" to all of Indian
country. The state legislature recognizes and includes tribal court crimi-
nal convictions for purposes of the state's Sexual Offenders Registration
and Community Right-to-Know Act.228
Maine, New York, and South Carolina extend full faith and credit to
certain tribes, based on codified settlements and accords. 229 None of
these states, however, holds that all tribes are entitled to full faith and
credit under 28 U.S.C § 1738.
V. THE TRIBAL COURT EXPERIENCE
Although a number of scholarly articles address the ongoing debate
of whether states should adopt, or be federally bound by, a full faith and
credit or comity approach to tribal court judgments, 230 a relatively small
number of published judicial opinions from the state courts address the
issue. One reason for the absence of published opinions is that the
parties involved rarely force the issue or have the resources to litigate a
contested and precedent making case in the state and federal courts.
Other times, parties unwillingly choose to litigate in state court fearing
possible delays and uncertainty associated with the enforceability of a
tribal court judgment. For instance, after five years of litigating an
adverse possession boundary dispute that originated in the Muscogee
(Creek) Nation District Court, the parties opted out of the tribal court
proceedings and sought a more timely resolution in the local state
court. 231 After an initial federal ruling, the parties anticipated that any
226. See id. at 902 n.2.
227. IDAHO CODE § 7-1001 (1998).
228. Id. § 18-8303 (Supp. 1999).
229. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-16-80 (Law Co-op. Supp. 1999); N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 52 (Mc-
Kinney 1950). Maine was required to adopt the federal claims settlement statute that included manda-
tory full faith and credit. See 25 U.S.C §§ 1721-1735. New York's statute applies to enforcement of
peace maker courts of the Seneca Nation. See N.Y. INDIAN LAW § 52. South Carolina's Catawba
settlement extends full faith and credit to one tribe only. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-16-80.
230. See Robert Laurence, Full Faith and Credit in Tribal Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sovereign-
ty, Cross-Boundary Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case of Eberhard v. Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REV. 19
(1998); B.J. Jones, supra note 50; Daina B. Garonzik, Comment, Full Reciprocity for Tribal Courts
From a Federal Courts Perspective: A Proposed Amendment to the Full Faith and Credit Act, 45
EMORY L.J. 723 (1996); Deloria & Laurence, supra note 107; Clinton, supra note 21; William V.
Vetter, Of Tribal Courts and "Territories" Is Full Faith and Credit Required?, 23 CAL. W. L. REV. 219
(1987); Ragsdale, supra note 27.
231. Telephone Interview with Jessie Huff Durham, Assistant Attorney General, Muscogee
(Creek) Nation (Aug. 19, 1999) [hereinafter Durham Telephone Interview]; see also Enlow v. Moore,
134 F.3d 993 (10th Cir. 1998); Enlow v. Bevenue, 4 OKLA. TImB. 175 (Muscogee (Creek) Nation Sup.
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remand to the tribal court would elicit further challenges to tribal
adjudicatory authority and several additional years of appellate
review. 232
But what do we know about how state standards translate to state
practice? Are states complying with federal laws that require them to
give full faith and credit to certain kinds of tribal judgments? Are states
with articulated policy directives, whether statute, court rule, or case
authority, more likely to enforce a tribal court's order than states with
no policy? Does the substantive content of a state's standard (say, full
faith and credit rather than international comity) affect recognition
practice at all?
A. METHODOLOGY
To answer these questions I turned to surveys and in-depth inter-
views with tribal court judges of federally recognized tribes in the lower
forty-eight states, and asked judges from eighty tribal court systems to
participate. 233 The data accumulated in this study is the first empirical
evidence to be published on the state recognition of tribal court
judgments. 234 Additionally, no previous publications examine how tribal
court judges view the record of their state counterparts in this area. 235
With data compiled approximately five years after the enactment of the
Violence Against Women Act and the Child Support Orders Act, and ten
years after the Indian Child Welfare Act, the study comes at an appropri-
ate time to reflect on past successes, in particular the issue of whether
Ct. 1994), available at 1994 WL 1048313.
232. Durham Telephone Interview, supra note 231; see also Moore, 134 F.3d 993; Bevenue, 4
OKLA. Tam. 175.
233. 1 distributed surveys to all tribal courts referenced in the National American Indian Court
Judges Association's active membership list and the ABA Judicial Division's DIRECTORY OF MINonrrY
JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1997) at sec. V: Tribal Judges of the United States.
The following responses and input of the following individuals provided the breath of life for
this article and are extended the most sincere thanks: Elizabeth C. Callard, Michael J. Stancampiano,
Robert Yazzie, James W. Zion, Jessie Huff Durham, Patrick E. Moore, Roger Wiley, David D.
Raasch, Mark Butterfield, Joan Greendeer-Lee, Phil Lujan, Charles Tripp, Arthur Windy Boy, Sr., Jill
Shibles, Ronald E. Johnny, Nathan Young, Rae N. Vaughn, Frank S. LaFountaine, Stan Wolfe, Mary
T. Wynne, Eugene White-Fish, Terry Moore, Patrick Lee, Charlene Yellow Kidney, Dwight Birdwell,
Scott V. Lundberg, Jay Pedro, William S. Christian, Patricia Riggs, Kathryn F. Van Hoof, and the late
F. Browning Pipestem.
234. Previous studies of tribal courts have provided statistical information on the operations of
tribal courts. See NATIONAL AMERICAN I NDIAN CoURT JuDGEs ASSOCIATION, INLN CouRTs Am T
FUTURE (1978) (surveying 23 tribal courts for purposes of determining the strengths and weaknesses of
tribal judiciaries); SAMUEL J. BRAKEL, AMERICAN INDIAN COURTS: THE COSTS OF SEPARATE JUSTICE
(1978). Other studies have provided valuable information on published tribal court opinions and the
development of tribal common law. See Russel Lawrence Barsh, Putting the Tribe in Tribal Courts:
Possible? Desirable?, 8 KAN. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 74, 77 (1999); Newton, supra note 16, at 352; Robert
D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of Custom in American Indian
Tribal Courts, 46 Am. J. COmp'. L. 287, 293 (1998).
235. Nor are there studies of the state courts regarding their experiences with tribal court judges.
Although such data would be an important contribution to the field, it is beyond the scope of this study.
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federal full faith and credit mandates are being carried out at the local
level.
Respondents to the initial questionnaire are self-selected and the
response rate is relatively low, at thirty-four percent. 236 Informants
willing to participate in follow-up interviews also are self-selected and are
not necessarily a representative sample. As a result, I have been cautious
in generalizing from this data, recognizing the number of factors that
affect the experience each tribal court judge reports. 237
Factors of particular importance in shaping a tribal court's experi-
ence are docket size and the length of the court's existence. Chief Judge
David Raasch of the Stockbridge-Munsee Band of Mohicans Tribal
Court responded to the survey by reporting no instance of non-
recognition. 238 But he notes that the court, which was established in
1995, is relatively new and has interacted with only one local state district
court. 239 Judge Raasch suggests that the comparatively short tenure of
modem tribal courts creates some skepticism among state judges, noting
that "[t]ribal courts are a recent development in the judicial process and
the state courts are a bit reluctant to recognize tribal court judg-
ments." 2 40 In contrast, the Navajo Nation courts, with over forty years
of experience and an annual docket approaching 75,000 cases, have had
many more opportunities for inter-jurisdictional conflict. The average
respondent tribal court in my survey was established in its modem
organization in 1980, ranging from the Oglala Sioux in 1936 to the
newly established court for the Tunica-Biloxi. 241
The breadth of subject matter entertained by a tribal court is also a
factor that determines its experience with state courts. The Ho-Chunk
Nation Tribal Court 242 does not hear petitions for domestic violence
236. Twenty-seven tribal courts responded. Responding tribes are located in the following 17
states: Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.
237. Perhaps judges who have recently had unsatisfactory experiences with other jurisdictions
would be more responsive as a means of airing their complaints, while judges who have not
experienced difficulties would place participation in my research at a lower priority.
238. See Response to Survey by Hon. David D. Raasch, Chief Judge, Stockbridge-Munsee Band
of Mohicans (Sept. 27, 1998) (on file with author).
239. See it t
240. See id.
241. Of the responding tribal courts, six courts have been established in this decade.
242. During 1996 and 1997 there were 266 civil cases filed in the Ho-Chunk Trial Court. See
Letter from Judges Mark Butterfield & Joan Greendeer-Lee, Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court, to Judge
Eugene White-Fish, Forest County Potawatomi Community (Mar. 22, 1998) (on file with author)
(responding to questions concerning jurisdiction over non-Indians and tribal sovereign immunity).
Only 32 of these cases involved non-Indian parties, 26 of which were filed by non-Indian employees.
See id.
In 1996, 59 of the 94 cases before the tribal court involved internal matters of the Ho-Chunk
Nation and its members, such as membership, trust funds, constitutional challenges, probate, and child
support obligations against a tribal member. See Ho-CttuNK NATTON TRIAL CoURT REPORT oNTRIBAL
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protection orders, 24 3 and therefore never interacts with courts concerning
the federally mandated full faith and credit implications under the
Violence Against Women Act. In the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Tribal
Courts, on the other hand, petitions for domestic violence protection
orders make up approximately sixteen percent of the annual caseload.244
B. OBSERVATIONS
Fifty-six percent of the respondent judges report at least one
occasion in which another jurisdiction refused to recognize their tribal
court orders, often in direct violation of state policy or federal law.245 Of
those tribes indicating non-recognition, eighty percent report that their
difficulties arose in a state forum, and twenty percent report problems
with other tribal courts. 246
But the most striking result of the study is the extent to which states
fail to recognize tribal court judgments even when required by federal
law to do so. Of the respondents indicating that a state court has failed
to recognize an order of their tribal court, over forty percent involved
subject matters covered by the federal full faith and credit mandates of
Violence Against Women Act and the Child Support Orders Act. 247
Roughly one-third of the total reported instances of non-recognition
involved custody disputes between parents. 248 Twenty-seven percent of
SOVEREIGTY (1996-1997) (on file with author). The remaining 35 cases involve non-Indians in areas
such as employment disputes, contract claims, and tort actions. See id.
243. Interview with Hon. Mark Butterfield, Chief Judge, Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court, Black
River Falls, Wis. (Feb. 15, 1999) [hereinafter Butterfield Interview].
244. See MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NATION JUDICIAL B RANCH FY 1998 ANNUAL REPORT 13 (1999). Of
the 170 new cases filed in 1998, 28 petitions were for protective orders. See i.
245. Fifteen of the 27 respondents, or 56%, report instances of non-recognition. See Appendix A
for tribe-by-tribe responses.
246. Twelve different tribes reported at least one occasion where a state failed to recognize a
tribal court order. Three tribes reported that another tribal court failed to recognize an order of the
respondent tribe. As indicated in the survey responses, there are instances when a reviewing tribal
court has failed to recognize an order of another tribal court. Even though such non-recognition
reportedly happens less frequent than state non-recognition, the fact that it occurs at all, particularly in
subject matter in which federal law requires full faith and credit, is problematic for the litigants
involved.
247. The Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma, the Chippewa-Cree Tribe, the Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe, and the Iowa Tribe of Oklahoma indicate non-recognition in Violence Againsts Women Act
cases. Response to Survey by Hon. Charles Tripp, Chief Judge, Kickapoo Tribal Ct. (June 20, 1999)
(on file with author); Response to Survey by Hon. Arthur Windy Boy, Sr., Chippewa Cree Tribal Ct.
(Apr. 5, 1999) (on file with author); Response to Survey by Hon. Jill Shibles, Chief Judge,
Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct. (Mar. 24, 1999) (on file with author); Response to Survey by Hon. Phil
Lujan, Dist. Ct. Judge, Iowa Tribe of Okla. (Oct. 1, 1998) (on file with author). The Duckwater
Shoshone CFR Court and the Ho-Chunk Nation indicate problems with child support awards. See
Letter and Response to Survey by Hon. Ronald E. Johnny, Chief Judge, Duckwater Tribal & Juv. Cts.
(Oct. 26, 1998) (on file with author).
248. See Response to Survey by Hon. Phil Lujan, Judge, Sac & Fox Nation Trial Ct. (Feb. 10,
1999) (on file with author); Letter and Response to Survey by Hon. Michael Stancampiano, Associate
Judge, Southern Ute Tribal Ct. (Oct. 1, 1998) (on file with author); Letter and Response to Survey by
Hon. Liz Callard, Associate Judge, Southern Ute Tribal Ct. (Dec. 2, 1998) (on file with author);
Response to Survey by Hon. Patrick Lee, Judge, Oglala Sioux Trial Ct. (Oct. 14, 1998) (on file with
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the courts that reported instances of non-recognition involved domestic
violence orders after the enactment of Violence Against Women Act. 249
The remaining instances of non-recognition cover a broad range of
subject matter from state agencies refusing to recognize tribal court
orders for purposes of vital statistics records 250 to money judgments in
consumer debt cases.
The standardized survey251 was designed to gather general infor-
mation about tribal courts and their experiences with cross-jurisdictional
recognition and enforcement of judgments. 252  From the responses, the
subject matter areas of child support, domestic violence protection and
child custody were specifically targeted for more thorough analysis.
These subject areas are extended full faith and credit by federal law and
therefore provide the backdrop for determining state compliance with
federal mandates. Respondent tribal judges highlighted the specific
cases I discuss below, most of which are unreported. 253 These specific
author).
249. That is, four courts out of the 15 that reported non-recognition: the Iowa Tribe of
Oklahoma, the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma, the Chippewa-Cree Tribe and the Mashantucket Pequot
Tribe. See supra note 247.
250. See Response to Survey by Hon. Rae N. Vaughn, Senior Judge, Mississippi Band of
Choctaw Indians (Mar. 23, 1999) (stating that the "Mississippi Department of vital statistics does not
recognize tribal court orders") (on file with author). The Department of Vital Statistics has refused to
accept court tribal court orders for purposes of modifying birth certificates, specifically, court orders
establishing paternity in situations where the natural parents are unmarried at the time of birth.
Telephone Interview with Hon. Rae N. Vaughn, Senior Judge, Mississippi Band of Choctaw Indians
(Aug. 17, 1999).
251. The Survey contained the following open-ended questions:
1. Do you recall any circumstance(s) when a judgment, order, or decree of your tribal
court was not recognized in another tribal court? (Explanation and cite requested);
2. Do you recall any circumstance(s) when a judgment, order, or decree of your tribal
court was not recognized in a state court? (Explanation and cite requested);
3. In your experience, are the following federal full faith and credit mandates being
followed by state courts?
(a) The Indian Child Welfare Act (full faith and credit to tribal court orders relating
to placement of children);
(b) The Prevention of Violence Against Women Act, (full faith and credit to
domestic violence protective orders);
(c) The Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act (full faith and credit to
child support awards).
In addition, the survey requested general information on the structure of the tribal court system and
solicited suggestions from tribal judges on what they believed to be the best approach to resolving
recognition and enforcement issues between state and tribal judiciaries.
252. It is important to note that the reported instances of non-recognition are balanced by reports
from other tribal judiciaries of growing success rates of recognition and improving local tribal-state
relations. See infra Part V.C.
253. The only case discussed in this section which was published in a widely circulated database
was the unpublished opinion of Benjamin W.E. v. Susan C., No. 16474-8-Ill, 1998 WL 289167 (Wash.
Ct. App. May 26, 1998). The Southern Ute case, which gave rise to the Washington proceeding is
unpublished and only available in the court files of the Southern Ute Tribe. See Order, Susan C. v.
Sam E. (Southern Ute Tribal Ct. July 21, 1995) (No. 91-DV-07). The cases discussed, infra, which
originated from the Ho-Chunk Tribal Court, the State of Oklahoma, the Mashantucket Pequot Court,
and the State of Connecticut either involve pending criminal proceedings, sealed juvenile proceedings,
or other unpublished documents. Therefore, information was obtained from examination of the court
records or through interviews with the judges and attorneys who were actively involved in the
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instances of non-recognition provide a glimpse of the practical realities
faced by tribal courts.
1. Child Support Orders-The Duckwater Shoshone Courts
and the States of Utah and Nevada
The federal full faith and credit mandate for child support orders
unambiguously includes tribal court orders:
The appropriate authorities of each State shall enforce accord-
ing to its terms a child support order made consistently with
this section by a court of another State . . . "State" means a
State of the United Sates, the District of Columbia, the
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the territories and possessions
of the United States, and Indian country. 254
Yet a policy directive prepared by the State of Utah Department of
Human Services, and still in use, blatantly violates the federal mandate on
child support orders by including in its regulations, the following
instruction to case workers: "Do not enforce a tribal court order on or
off the reservation." 255
proceedings.
254. Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738B (1994 & Supp. IV
1998). "Indian country" is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 to include:
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United
States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities
within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently
acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all
Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including
rights-of-way running through the same.
255. Attachment to Letter from Denise Thacker, ORS Agent, Utah Dep't of Human Services
Office of Recovery Services, to Elko County State Collections (Aug. 18, 1998) (on file with author).
In a letter addressed to the Nevada State Collections Department, the State of Utah Department of
Human Services Office of Recovery Services provided a copy of the Utah policy directive on case
management stating the following:
There are several situations involving Native American obligors which require different
case handling. SERVICE OF PROCESS. Do not serve a Native American on the reser-
vation or at a Post Office Box on the reservation. If service is necessary to establish or
modify an order, serve the Native American obligor off the reservation at home or work.
If the obligor lives and works on the reservation you may petition the tribal court to
establish a support order, but practically speaking, it may not be possible to proceed with
case work. Review at a later date for changes in the obligor's circumstances.
ENFORCEMENT. Do not enforce upon or attach any asset located on the reservation,
including any income source, personal property or real property. Do not enforce a tribal
court order on or off the reservation. If the obligor has a tribal court order for support,
you may petition the tribal court to enforce the order. TAX INTERCEPT. Do not inter-
cept federal tax refunds to Native American obligors unless the obligor has a support
order that was taken through a state district court or administrative body (ORS/CSS). Do
not intercept state tax refunds to Native American obligors unless the obligor has a
support order or a judgment taken through a state district court or administrative body.
Do not intercept taxes based on tribal court orders. Delete cases involving Native
American obligors from federal or state tax certification if they are not properly
certified according to the above criteria. If taxes are inadvertently intercepted, refund
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In 1990, the Duckwater Shoshone Court of Indian Offenses 256
issued an order requiring child support payments. 257 The State of
Nevada later became involved by assisting the mother in her child
support collection efforts against the father, who is incarcerated by the
State of Utah. Nevada asked for assistance from Utah's child support
enforcement agencies, but failed. Utah's child support enforcement
agency closed their collection case because a tribal court issued the
original order.258
Upon notification that Utah refused to enforce the order, the Chief
Judge of the Duckwater Shoshone Tribal and Juvenile Courts contacted
officials in Utah and Nevada, providing detailed information about the
Duckwater Shoshone Judicial System259 and reminding Utah of the
federal full faith and credit mandate requiring enforcement. 260 He also
informed the U.S. Attorney's office of the state of Utah's failure to
enforce pursuant to federal law. To date, Utah officials have not re-
opened the case and assisted Nevada with collections. The U.S. Attorney
for the District of Utah has taken no action.261
The policy that justified Utah's refusal to enforce the order has not
been updated since October 1992. Congress enacted the Child Support
Orders Act federal mandate for nation-wide child support enforcement,
including tribal court orders, in 1994. Years later, Utah has not updated
as quickly as possible. If an intercept or certification involving a Native American
obligor is contested, consult with your Regional Director. Note: Set aside orders which
were improperly taken against Native American obligors. Do not attempt to enforce
such orders. Tribal court orders supersede administrative orders. Take steps to ensure
that the administratively ordered obligations do not continue to accrue past the date of the
tribal court order. (emphasis added)
256. The Duckwater Court of Indian Offenses was established in 1975 and abolished in 1996.
See 61 Fed. Reg. 10,673, 10,674 (1996). The Duckwater Shoshone Tribal Court became operational
in 1995. See Response to Survey by Hon. Ronald E. Johnny, Chief Judge, Duckwater Shoshone
Judicial System (Oct. 26, 1998) (on file with author).
257. See Letter from Hon. Ronald E. Johnny, Chief Judge, Duckwater Tribal & Juv. Cts., to
Robin Amold-Williams, Executive Director, Dep't of Human Services Office of Recovery Services
(Oct. 12, 1998) (on file with author) (citing Judgment Order Awarding Child Support (Duckwater Ct.
Ind. Off. Nov. 26, 1990)).
258. See Letter from Denise Thacker, ORS Agent, Utah Dep't of Human Services Office of
Recovery Services, to Elko County State Collections (Aug. 18, 1998) (copy on file with author).
259. An incorrect assumption pointed out by Judge Johnny concerns the classification of the
Duckwater Shoshone CIO as a "tribal court." See Letter from Hon. Ronald E. Johnny, supra note 247.
At the time the child support order was entered, Duckwater Shoshone courts were operated as a Court
of Indian Offences. See Letter from Hon. Ronald E. Johnny, supra note 247 (citing 58 Fed. Reg.
54,406, 54,412 (1993); 25 C.F.R. 11 .1 (a)(15) (1984) (identifying Duckwater Shoshone CFR court)).
Judge Johnny points out that Courts of Indian Offenses are federal courts. Letter from Hon.
Ronald E. Johnny, supra note 247 (citing Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, 691 (1990); United States v.
Red Lake Band of Chippewa Indians, 827 F.2d 380, 383 (8th Cir. 1987)). But c.f. Parker v. Saupitty, I
OKLA. Tha. 1, 4 (Comanche CIO 1979), available at 1979 WL 50343 (finding that CFR court derives
its authority from the sovereignty of the tribes which it serves, and not as an arm of the federal
government).
260. See Letter from Hon. Ronald E. Johnny, supra note 247.
261. Telephone Interview with Hon. Ronald E. Johnny, Chief Judge, Duckwater Shoshone
Judicial System (Aug. 26, 1999) (indicating no response from Utah or the U.S. Attorney for Utah).
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its agency procedures to reflect the change in federal law, and federal
agencies will not force compliance.
Again, the practical effects of non-enforcement of tribal court child
support orders frustrate many policy directives. In this case, there are
parental assets in Utah owed to a child in Nevada that the child must do
without because of state intransigence. Interestingly, this is not due to
the mother relocating to another state. Even if she currently resided in
Utah, she would not receive state enforcement assistance to recover the
child's money against the father. The policy mandates of the Child
Support Orders Act seek to eliminate collection problems by "facili-
tat[ing] enforcement of child support order[s]" in order to provide
greater financial stability for children.262 The Child Support Orders
Act's policy has been circumvented, quite simply, as the Chief Judge of
the Duckwater Shoshone puts it, because "Utah state agencies ... do not
abide by federal law." 263
2. Domestic Violence Protection Orders-The Mashantucket
Pequot Tribe and State of Connecticut.
The Mashantucket Pequot tribal court2 64 entered a domestic vio-
lence protective order instructing an individual I will call Jack, to refrain
from threatening or causing bodily harm to an individual I will call Jane.
Jane alleges that Jack violated the order by attacking her within the
jurisdiction of the State of Connecticut. 265
In this situation, federal law requires Connecticut to accord the
Mashantucket Pequot protection order full faith and credit and enforce
the order as if it were an order issued by a Connecticut court. 266 The
262. See Full Faith and Credit for Child Support Orders Act, Pub. L. No. 103-383, 1994
U.S.C.C.A.N (108 Stat. 4063) 3259, 3260.
263. Response to Survey by Hon. Ronald E. Johnny, Chief Judge, Duckwater Shoshone Judicial
System (Oct. 6, 1998) (on file with author).
264. The court system was established in 1992 and includes a court of general and original
jurisdiction, as well as subject-matter specific courts, such as the Gaming Enterprise Division by tribal
ordinance. See Newton, supra note 16, at 300 (citing Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Court Ordinance
No. 011092-02 (1992)). The Division of Gaming Enterprise has jurisdiction only over claims
authorized by the Mashantucket Pequot Sovereign Immunity Waiver Ordinance.
265. See Response to Survey by Hon. Jill Shibles, Chief Judge, Mashantucket Pequot Tribal Ct.
(Mar. 24, 1999) (on file with author).
266. See 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (1994).
Full Faith and Credit. Any protection order issued.., by the court of one State or Indian
Tribe (the issuing State or Indian tribe) shall be accorded full faith and credit by the
court of another State or Indian tribe (the enforcing State or Indian tribe) and enforced
as if it were the order of the enforcing State or tribe.
Id. § 2265(a). Subsection b is consistent with other full faith and credit statutes that require the issuing
court to have jurisdiction over parties and provide the minimum due process standards of notice and
hearing. See id. § 2265(b). The Violence Against Women Act, however, requires that personal and
subject matter jurisdiction be measured by the laws of the issuing forum. See id. § 2265(b)(1).
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Connecticut criminal statutes, however, do not clearly accommodate this
federal mandate, and appear to prevent effective cross-jurisdictional
enforcement of orders. Connecticut law defines the crime of violation of
a protective order as violations of an order issued pursuant to Connecti-
cut law.267 Connecticut's family law statutes reference the Violence
Against Women Act and direct that Connecticut protective orders are to
be enforced in all other jurisdictions, but include no procedures for Con-
necticut to provide the same treatment to orders of other jurisdictions. 268
In this instance, the failure to recognize foreign judgments does not
single out tribal court orders for special disregard, but treats all foreign
judgments similarly.269
This non-enforcement leading to failure to prosecute for criminal
violation of a standing protective order is of particular importance in
situations of violence against Indian women because of a reprehensible
gap in criminal jurisdiction for these types of crimes. Federal law divests
tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and, at times, over non-
member Indians even when the perpetrator is a resident of the reser-
vation. 270 Federal jurisdiction of crimes within Indian country is limited
to specific enumerated crimes, and does not include misdemeanor viola-
tions of protective orders.271 The lack of comprehensive criminal juris-
diction in Indian country means the majority of batterers who violate
protective orders are subject to no prosecution at all, particularly if state
criminal statutes narrowly define violations of protective orders so as to
preclude prosecution. Although Indian women are more likely to experi-
ence domestic violence than any other category of citizens, 272 they are
267. A person is guilty of criminal violation of a protective order when an order issued pursuant
to subsection e of section 46b-38c or section 54-1k has been issued against each person, and such
person violated such order. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-1 10b. (West 1998). The references to
§ 46b-38c and § 54-1k make it a violation only when orders are entered pursuant to Connecticut's
family law statutes which allow Connecticut courts to issue protective orders. See id. § 53a-1 10b(a).
268. See id. §§ 46b-38c, 54-1k (West 1998). For instance, Connecticut statutes provide for a
24-hour registry of protective orders "issued under" Connecticut's statute for issuance of protective
orders, yet fail to provide for registration for orders from foreign jurisdictions. See id. § 46b-38c(e).
However, Connecticut has recently made advances in the area of recoginizing money judgments. See
infra Part IV.C.2.
269. There is no Connecticut caselaw addressing the issue of whether an order of another state
would be honored.
270. In Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the United States Supreme Court held that Indian
nations do not retain criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians. Later the same year, Congress
overturned the Court's decision by statutorily recognizing tribal criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.
See 25 U.S.C. § 1301(2).
271. See Indian Major Crimes Act, 23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §
1153 (1994)).
272. Results from a study conducted between 1992-1996 which included the National Crime
Victimization Survey indicate that Indian people experience a disproportionate number of assaults.
See LAURENCE A. GREENFELD & STvEN K. SMrrs, AMmuCAN INDtANS ANmCiME, in DEPARTh ENT F
JusTIcE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATI STICS, at v-vi (Feb. 1999). The rate of violence experienced by
Indian women is nearly 50% higher than that of black men. See id. American Indians experience
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not receiving the protection envisioned in Violence Against Women
Act.273
The Violence Against Women Act presents other practical prob-
lems in terms of notice, often requiring an individual to obtain two
protective orders, one from a tribal court and one from a state court.
The Iowa Tribe of Oklahoma and the Kickapoo Tribe of Oklahoma
experienced this problem when attempting to provide notice of protec-
tion orders to state law enforcement officials in Oklahoma, where no
electronic database or other registration procedures are available to tribal
courts. Judges from both tribes indicate that when domestic violence
victims present tribal orders to state law enforcement officials, they are
routinely told that they must also obtain a state order because the state
officials can "do nothing" with the tribal order. 274 Some tribal court
judges counsel individuals who are granted a tribal court protective order
to also seek a state order in order to minimize potential problems.275
3. Child Custody and Placement
Custody proceedings involving Indian children fall into two distinct
categories for purposes of recognition, depending on who is seeking
custody. Custody battles between parents are outside the scope of the
Indian Child Welfare Act, which carries a federal full faith and credit
mandate. Custody battles between parents are governed by the Child
violence more than twice the national average, and 70% of the crimes are committed by non-Indians.
See id.; Fox Butterfield, Indians Are Crime Victims At Rate Above U.S. Average, N.Y. TIMSs, Feb. 15,
1999, at A5.
A survey of Navajo women in portions of New Mexico and Arizona indicates that 28% of
women age 50 and over and 52% of women under 50 report being struck at least once. See Means v.
District Court of the Chinle Judicial District, at 3 n.8, No. SC-CV-61-98 (Navajo Nation Sup. Ct. May
11, 1999) (citing Kunitz, Levy, McCloskey & Bagriel, Alcohol Dependence and Domestic Violence as
Sequelae of Abuse and Conduct Disorder in Childhood, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEoLECT 1079, 1088
(1998)). In comparison, 9% to 30% of women in other populations report being struck at least once.
See id.
273. The Mashantucket Pequot example is not an isolated occurrence. The most common
problem reported is associated with providing notice to other jurisdictions that a tribal protective order
has been issued, as a preemptive measure. Although the Colville Tribe reports success as a participant
in the State of Washington's electronic registration database, other tribes report particular problems
with local law enforcement officials. Hon. Mary T. Wynne, former Chief Judge of the Colville Tribal
Court, Presentation to the National American Indian Court Judges Association, National Tribal Judicial
Conference, Washington D.C. (Mar. 24, 1999). The Colville Tribal Court reports good communication
between state and tribal officials, particularly in the subject matters covered in Violence Against
Women Act, referencing the willingness and cooperation of sheriffs in both Okanogan and Ferry
counties to enforce Colville domestic violence orders outside the reservation boundaries and on the
Colville reservation in areas under state jurisdiction. See Responses to Survey by Hon. Frank S.
LaFountaine, Colville Tribal Ct. (Feb. 21, 1999) (on file with author).
274. See Response to Survey by Hon. Phil Lujan, Dist. Ct. Judge, Sac & Fox Nation (Oct. 1, 1998)
(on file with author); Telephone Interview with Hon. Charles H. Tripp, Chief Judge, Kickapoo Tribal
Ct. (June 20, 1999).
275. Interview with Hon. Patrick E. Moore, District Court Judge, Muscogee (Creek) Nation, in
Okmulgee, Okla. (Nov. 6, 1998).
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Custody Agreement and the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, but
neither expressly include tribal court proceedings within its scope.
a. Indian Child Welfare Proceedings: The Ho-Chunk
Nation and State of Oklahoma
The Indian Child Welfare Act directs state, federal and tribal courts
to recognize a tribal court order concerning custody of an Indian child:
The United States, every State, every territory or possession of
the United States, and every Indian tribe shall give full faith
and credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings
of any Indian tribe applicable to Indian child custody pro-
ceedings to the same extent that such entities give full faith and
credit to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of
any other entity. 276
This clear federal mandate applies particularly in instances where the
child is a ward of the tribal court,277 as in the following pending
Ho-Chunk proceeding.
In late summer, 1998, on a petition of the tribe's child and family
service officials, the Ho-Chunk Nation Tribal Court 278 made a family of
Indian children wards of the court. The court then entered an order
placing the children in foster care. 279 At the time the children were
276. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. § 191 l(d) (1994).
277. See id. § 1911 (a) ("Where an Indian child is a ward of a tribal court, the Indian tribe shall
retain exclusive jurisdiction, notwithstanding the residence or domicile of the child.").
278. The Ho-Chunk Tribal Court, established in 1995, entertains limited jurisdiction as dictated by
the tribal legislature. See Letter and Response to Survey from Hon. Mark Butterfield, Chief Judge,
Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Ct. (Oct. 20, 1998) (on file with author). The Ho-Chunk court system consists
of three divisions: The Trial Court, the Supreme Court and the Traditional Court. See id. Trial level
judges are appointed by the legislature for three year terms. See id. Supreme Court judges are
elected by the membership of the tribe. See id. The Traditional Court consists of 12 elders who are
acknowledged clan leaders or senior men of standing in the community. See id.
The subject matter areas entertained by the court generally consist of juvenile proceedings,
child support enforcement, employment law, and internal governmental matters. See Ho-CHUNK
NATON TRIL COURT REPORT ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY (1996-1997) (on file with author). During 1996
and 1997 there were 266 civil cases filed in the Ho-Chunk Trial Court. See Letter from Judges Mark
Butterfield & Joan Greendeer-Lee, Ho-Chunk Trial Ct., to Judge Eugene White-Fish, Forest County
Potawatomi Community (Mar. 22, 1998) (on file with author) (responding to questions concerning juris-
diction over non-Indians and tribal sovereign immunity). Only 32 of these cases involved non-Indian
parties, 26 of which were filed by non-Indian employees. See id.
In 1996, 59 of the 94 cases before the tribal court involved internal matters of the Ho-Chunk
Nation and its members, such as membership, trust funds, constitutional challenges, probate, and child
support obligations against a tribal member. See HO-CHUNK N AnON T RiAL C OURT REPORT ON T RiBAL
SOVEREIGNTY (1996-1997) (on file with author). The remaining 35 cases involved non-Indians in areas
such as employment disputes, contract claims, and tort actions. See id.
279. Butterfield Interview, supra note 243. As of August 1999, these juvenile proceedings are
pending in Ho-Chunk Nation tribal court, with the minor children placed in an undisclosed foster
home. Telephone Interview with Hon. Mark Butterfield, Chief Judge, Ho-Chunk Nation Trial Court
(Aug. 20, 1999) [hereinafter Butterfield Telephone Interview]. The proceedings are sealed and, as a
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removed from the physical custody of their natural mother, they were
spending the summer in the Ho-Chunk Nation and planning a return to
Oklahoma, where they would be in the custody of their natural father
during the school year. This custody arrangement had been established
in a previous custody order entered by an Oklahoma court. 280
At summer's end, the mother could not return the children to
Oklahoma because they were in the legal custody of the Ho-Chunk
Nation. Oklahoma issued a warrant for the mother's arrest under a state
kidnapping statute for her failure to comply with the Oklahoma custody
order, and she was subsequently arrested by Wisconsin state officials and
extradited to Oklahoma. 281 She spent approximately three months in jail
prior to a pretrial release. 282 Her felony jury trial was scheduled in
Ottawa County, Oklahoma for the fall of 1999.283 On the day of the
jury trial, the judge dismissed the case sua sponte as moot, because the
children had then been returned to their father.284 The state court judge
never addressed the existence of the Ho-Chunk order to the Ho-Chunk
nation's assumption of jurisdiction over the children. 285 In the year
since the warrant was issued, neither the prosecutor nor the district court
judge in Oklahoma had made any effort to communicate with the tribal
court.
2 8 6
b. Divorce Proceedings: The Southern Ute Tribe and
Washington State
The type of scenario described in the introduction, when an un-
satisfied parent in a divorce proceedings physically removes a child from
one jurisdiction to another to avoid further tribal court rulings, is
perhaps the most complicated issue presented in the area of recognition
and enforcement. The Southern Ute Tribe, along with four other
matter of Ho-Chunk law, the style and number of the case cannot be disclosed. The procedural
history of the case is reported by the presiding judge.
280. Telephone Interview with Nathan Young, Attorney (Aug. 19, 1999). Nathan Young is the
mother's defense attorney in the criminal proceedings in Ottawa County, Oklahoma. See id.
281. See id.
282. See id. The defendant was jailed for one month pending extradition from Black River Falls,
Wisconsin, and subsequently jailed two months in Ottawa County, Oklahoma before posting bond for
pretrial release. See id.
283. See id. After pretrial motions were considered and a preliminary hearing was held, the
case was scheduled on an upcoming felony jury docket. See id.
284. See id.
285. See id. No written order of dismissal was issued by the state court. See id.
286. Butterfield Telephone Interview, supra note 279. Judge Butterfield indicated that the tribal
court has never been contacted by any Oklahoma official regarding this matter. The state has not
asked to review the tribal court record.
The experience with the state of Wisconsin has been relatively cooperative, with the majority
of enforcement problems arising in other states. Although the Ho-Chunk judges note much room for
improvement in the area of recognition and enforcement in state courts, they note that Ho-Chunk
judgments "fa[re] better in Wisconsin than outside the state." Response to Survey from Hon. Mark
Butterfield, Chief Judge, Ho-Chunk Trial Court (Oct. 20, 1998) (on file with author).
2000] 357
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REViEW
respondents to this study, report similar experiences. 287 In no other
area of law is recognition of judgments across jurisdictions more
unpredictable, or more dangerous to children.
The Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act was intended to reduce
cross-jurisdictional conflict in parental custody disputes. 288 Although
the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act was enacted two years after the
Indian Child Welfare Act, which specifically mandated full faith and
credit for tribal court orders, it is silent as to tribes. The Parental Kid-
napping Prevention Act's definition of "State," makes no reference to
"Indian country" as do later laws such as the Child Support Orders Act
or the Violence Against Women Act. 289 The Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act language mirrors the full faith and credit implementing
statute (28 U.S.C. § 1738) and raises the same question of whether tribes
should be considered "territories or possessions." The Fourth Circuit
has classified tribes as "territories" for Parental Kidnapping Prevention
Act purposes in an opinion reminiscent of Mackey, although without
reference thereto. 290 At least one reported tribal court decision agrees
with the Fourth Circuit interpretation. 291 This statutory silence creates
two kinds of problems: (1) whether the states must recognize tribal child
custody orders; and (2) whether the tribes must recognize the orders of
state courts or other tribal courts as final.
In addition to uncertainty surrounding the Parental Kidnapping
Prevention Act's scope of applicability, conflicting interpretations of
tribal court jurisdiction over divorce proceedings involving non-Indians
also create problems. Even if the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act
expressly included tribes within its definition of "States," the outcome
of many of these divorce cases would not change.
287. See Response to Survey by Hon. Phil Lujan, Sac & Fox Nation Trial Ct. (Feb. 10, 1999) (on
file with author) (indicating that non-recognition in these type of proceedings has "happened several
times" in conflicts with Texas, Arkansas, and Utah); Letter and Response to Survey by Hon. Liz
Callard, Associate Judge, Southern Ute Tribal Ct. (Dec. 2, 1998) (on file with author) (referencing
Susan C. matter, supra, note 1); Response to Survey by Hon. Patrick Lee, Oglala Sioux Trial Ct. (Oct.
14, 1998) (on file with author) (indicating a refusal to return child to custodian per Oglala custody
order and another tribal court ignored Oglala order); Letter and Response to Survey by Hon. Michael
Stancampiano, Associate Judge, Southern Ute Tribal Ct. (Oct. 1, 1998) (on file with author)
(referencing Susan C. matter, supra note 1).
288. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738A (1994 & Supp. IV 1998).
289. See id. 1738A(b)(8) (defining "State" as "a State of the United States, the District of
Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States").
A detailed legislative history to the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act can be found in
Eberhard v. Eberhard, 24 INDIAN L. Rrm. 6059, 6063-6064 (Chy. R. Sx. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 1997)
(holding tribes are bound by scope of the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act). But see Robert
Laurence. Full Faith and Credit in Tribal Courts: An Essay on Tribal Sovereignty, Cross-Boundary
Reciprocity and the Unlikely Case of Eberhard v. Eberhard, 28 N.M. L. REv. 19 (1998).
290. See In re Larch, 872 F.2d 66 (4th Cir. 1989).
291. See Eberhard, 24 INDIAN L. Rrm. at 6064.
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Revisiting the Southern Ute-Washington scenario is illustrative.
According to the tribal court record, Susan C. initiated the proceedings
and the tribal court had personal and subject matter jurisdiction. This
should have foreclosed collateral review. Instead, the state court framed
the issue as follows: Will a tribe's exercise of jurisdiction in a divorce
proceeding between a reservation Indian and a non-Indian residing off
the reservation preclude collateral attack in state court? The answer is
unclear. The only clear pronouncement regarding tribal court juris-
diction in divorce proceedings is that exclusive jurisdiction lies with the
tribe only when both parties are tribal members and domiciled within
Indian country. 292 When non-Indians are involved, state courts have at
least concurrent jurisdiction, 293 and results could differ depending on
jurisdiction. If states adopt narrow views of tribal jurisdiction over the
divorce proceeding and ancillary custody determinations, as Washington
did in the Susan C. scenario, even an amendment to the general full faith
and credit statute unequivocally including tribes (an unlikely political
development) will not put an end to the problem. The only solution is to
include tribes within the parameter of the Parental Kidnapping Preven-
tion Act and the Child Custody Act as equal partners with the states in
terms of jurisdiction.
C. PRESENT SUCCESSES AND OPTIMISM FOR THE FUTURE
This section briefly highlights successes and discusses the political
climates that give rise to better relationships. The Southern Ute Tribe,
despite the problems experienced with other states, reports it is experienc-
ing an increasingly cooperative environment with Colorado, a state with
no official policy. This spirit of cooperation is partially conditioned on
the fact that the tribe plays a vibrant role in the local economy as one of
La Plata County's largest employers of Indians and non-Indians alike. 294
All garnishment proceedings of wages from tribal business have to
proceed through the tribal court, so there are a number of cross-jurisdic-
tional enforcement proceedings. 295 The state and tribe have established
uniform forms for domestic violence orders and therefore have little
uncertainty among law enforcement on both sides. 296 Increased coopera-
292. See FkLix S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF Ft.DRAL INDIAN LAW 342 (1982 ed.).
293. See generally Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1988) (tribal jurisdiction upheld
when non-Indian plaintiff and Indian defendant both resided on the reservation); Wells v. Wells, 451
N.W.2d 402 (S.D. 1990) (state may exercise concurrent jurisdiction unless both parties are members
residing on the reservation); Byzewski v. Byzewski, 429 N.W.2d 394 (N.D. 1988).
294. Callard/Stancampiano Interview, supra note 2.
295. Callard/Stancampiano Interview, supra note 2.
296. Callard/Stancampiano Interview, supra note 2; see also Letter and Response to Survey from
Hon. Michael Stancampiano, Associate Judge, Southern Ute Tribal Ct. (Oct. I, 1998) (on file with
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tion is partially attributed to familiarity between state and tribal judges in
the area. Tribal court judge Elizabeth Callard served as a state court
judge prior to her appointment to the tribal bench. 297
The Navajo Nation court system, which maintains the largest docket
of any tribal court, has experienced many challenges to recognition over
the years, and has faced a particularly challenging political climate due
to the fact that the reservation falls within the boundaries of three differ-
ent states: New Mexico, Arizona, and Utah, each of which approaches
the recognition of tribal court judgments from a different policy.
Although the Navajo judiciary indicates "the situation in [the] region is
confused," the situation is improving somewhat. 298 The Navajo Nation
is finding the most success with informal meetings with state justices and
judges. Chief Justice Yazzie has met on occasion with the chief justices
of Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah. In Arizona, a recent trend of favor-
able decisions is underway, and a proposed tribal court recognition and
enforcement rule to be submitted for approval of the Arizona Supreme
Court is in the final stages. 299 In the past, Navajo judgments have not
been recognized on the basis of the Navajo repossession statute because
the Navajo law violated state public policy concerns. 300 The Navajo
repossession statute prohibits self-help repossessions within the tribe's
territorial jurisdiction and requires the creditor to obtain written consent
of the debtor or an order of the District Court of the Navajo Nation
allowing removal of property. 30 1 Although this same approach to
repossession has been adopted by states, such as Wisconsin and Louisi-
ana, the Navajo approach has been frowned upon by reviewing courts
under a comity analysis. 302
VI. CONCLUSION
Federal laws mandating full faith and credit for tribal court judg-
ments in the limited subject matter areas of domestic violence protective
orders, child support orders, and orders pertaining to child custody have
been on the books for over five years, yet many states are not abiding by
federal law. From the reports of tribal judges, I have documented several
instances in which federal law has been misapplied, and in some cases,
blatantly ignored by reviewing jurisdictions.
author).
297. Callard/Stancampiano Interview, supra note 2.
298. Interview with James Zion, Solicitor for the Courts of the Navajo Nation, Albuquerque,
N.M. (Jan. 12, 1999) [hereinafter Zion Interview].
299. See Proposed Rules, supra note 177.
300. See 7 NAVAJO NATION CODE § 607 (1995) (repossession of personal property).
301. See id.
302. See LA. CODECV. PROC. ANN. art 3541 (West Supp. 2000) (requiring secured creditor to
obtain writ of attachment); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 425.206(l)(b)(West Supp. 1999); see also Paul E. Frye,
Lender Recourse in Indian Country: A Navajo Case Study, 21 N.M. L. REV. 275, 297 (1991).
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The practical problems encountered by tribal courts have relatively
little to do with a lack of uniformity in which states adopt their own
approach to recognition, but instead, rest on a failure to comply with
existing federal law. In fact, the data suggests that noncompliance with
federal law is quite prevalent even in jurisdictions that have purportedly
adopted quite progressive "full faith and credit" approaches. 303 As
one respondent stated "we really don't need a new law, we simply have
to understand and agree on an interpretation of the current law." 304
The current federal laws do not, however, provide enforcement
mechanisms to require states to follow the law, and, as indicated in the
survey responses, the local U.S. Attorney's office can be unresponsive.
For this reason, federal laws must be amended to provide private causes
of action to compel recognition.
The most troubling result of this unfettered lack of compliance is
that the subject matters most frequently at issue are those which go
directly to a tribal government's ability to regulate its domestic affairs
and protect individuals from violence. Of the tribal courts reporting
instances of non-recognition, only one tribe reported non-recognition
outside of the realm of domestic relations' law. 305 All other instances of
non-recognition involved orders that lie at the very heart of a tribe's
ability to regulate domestic relations through dissolution proceedings,
custody proceedings, paternity determinations, and prevention of domes-
tic violence. 306
This data suggests a deeper problem than a few isolated cases of
hardship for tribal court litigants who were unsuccessful in having their
judgments recognized cross-jurisdictionally, or even the failure of
federal mandates. At bottom, non-recognition is a challenge to tribal
sovereignty. A government's survival is inextricably bound to its ability
to regulate domestic affairs issues, 307 to have the control to improve the
social conditions of its citizens, and to have its determinations validated,
rather than circumvented, by other sovereigns.
303. Some of the most blatant non-recognition examples highlighted by the respondent judges
occurred in states such as Oklahoma and Washington, that have adopted comparatively progressive
recognition and enforcement standards, yet on a case-by-case basis do not abide by federal law.
304. See Response to Survey by Hon. David D. Raasch, Chief Judge, Stockbridge-Munsee Band
of Mohicans (Sept. 27, 1998) (on file with author).
305. The Navajo Nation indicates non-recognition in consumer debt cases involving the Navajo
repossession statute. Zion Interview, supra note 298.
306. See subject matters outlines in Appendix A.
307. See Michael E. Connelly, Note, Tribal Jurisdiction Under Section 1911(b) of the Indian
Child Welfare Act of 1978: Are the States Respecting Indian Sovereignty? 23 N.M. L. REV. 479 (1993)
(noting that tribal control over the placement of minor tribal members in custody proceedings is crucial
to governmental survival).
2000]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
To the questions presented at the outset of this article, the data pro-
vides one clear-cut answer. There is a documented lack of state compli-
ance with federal law. With respect to whether states with articulated
policy directives, be they more akin to comity or full faith and credit,
recognize tribal judgments at a higher rate than those states with no such
policy, the findings reveal that even the most progressive approaches are
still plagued by non-compliance at the local level.
The lack of compliance with federal mandates poses a threat to
tribal sovereignty but more importantly to mainstream concerns; it also
fosters inefficient allocation of judicial resources by allowing dissatisfied
litigants the opportunity to shop forums. Such behavior, particularly in
the realm of domestic relations law, is contrary to federal policy direc-
tives that have already been addressed by uniform jurisdiction law and
kidnapping prevention legislation.
If states are to sit in review of tribal court judgments and, at times,
function as the only means of local enforcement of those judgments,
there must be meaningful avenues for federal intervention to force
compliance. As it stands, federal full faith and credit mandates are
toothless. In order to protect tribal litigants, particularly those seeking
enforcement in child support collection efforts similar to the Utah
example, Congress must provide for a federal cause of action to compel
state action. Otherwise, federal law is exempting a class of individual
litigants, Indian and non-Indian alike, from federal protection based on
the happenstance that their lawsuits arose under jurisdiction of a tribal
court.
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TRIBAL COURT BY A STATE COURT BYA TRIBAL COURT SUBJECT MATTER(S)
CHEROKEE (OK) NO NO
COEUR D'ALENE NO NO
CHPPEWA-CE PROTECnVE ORDER;
YES NO CHILD CUSMTY ORDER
COLVILLE NO NO
CONFEDERATED SAUSH NO YES Di NOT SPECIFY
& KOOTENAI
DUCKVWATER SHOSHONE YES NO CHILD SUPPORT ORDER
EASTERN CHEROKEE NO NO
GILA RIVER NO NO
HoCHUNK INDIAN CHILD WELFARE PLACE-YES NO MEN'r;
IMPROPERLY MODIFIED CHILD
SUPPORT ORDER
IOWA (OK) YES NO PROTECrIVE ORDER
KicKAPoo (OK) YES NO PROTECTIVE ORDER
MASHANTUCKET PEQUOT YES NO PROTECTIVE ORDER
MENOMINEE YES YES CHILD CUSTODY ORDER
MILLE LAcs BAND OF
OJMWE NO NO
MssnsP BAND YES NO PATERNTY RuiNOS FOR
OF CHOCTAW VrTAL STATISTICS RECORDS
MUSCOGEE (CREEK) NO NO
NAVAJO YES NO REPOSSESSION IN
CONSUMER DEBT
OGLALA SioUX NO YES CHILD CUSTODY ORDER
OTOE-MISSOURIA YES NO PROPERTY DIVISION IN
DIVORCE PROCEEDING
PRAIRIE ISLAND
COMMUNrrY OF NO NO
MDEWAKANTON SIoUX
SAC & Fox (OK) YES NO CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
BETWEEN PARENTS
SAN ILDEFONSO PUEBLO NO NO
SPOKANE NO
SoUTHERN UTE CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTE
YES NO BETWEEN PARENTS;MENTAL HEALTH COMMrrmEN
ORDER
STOCKBRIDGE-MUNSEE
BAND OF MOmcANs NO NO
TWucA-BEuoxi NO NO
YSLE A DEL SUR PUEBLO NO NO
* * *
